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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CRAIG L. MULFORD,
Supreme Court Docket No. 39991-2012
(District Court No. CV-2009-4313-PI)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Defendant-Respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"),
respectfully submits this Brief in answer to the Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant,
Craig L. Mulford ("Mulford").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Union Pacific machinist Craig L. Mulford filed a Complaint under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. ("FELA"), in the Sixth Judicial District
Court, Bannock County, Idaho. (R Vol. I, p. 1.) Mulford alleged that he was injured when
he tripped over a piece of railroad equipment. (R Vol. I, p.3; T p. 204, LL. 16-19. (Cited
Transcript excerpts are attached to this Brief as Addendum A.» He alleged that he was
1

disabled from employment as a result of his injuries and sought past and future wages
and lost benefits. (R Vol. I, p. 3-6; T p. 204, LL. 1-3.) Union Pacific answered the
Complaint, raising Mulford's duty to mitigate his damages as an affirmative defense. (R
Vol. I, p. 8.) After a four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for Union Pacific. (R Vol.
II, p. 379.) To the question on the Special Verdict, "Was the Defendant negligent, and if
so, was this negligence a cause, no matter how slight, of the Plaintiffs injuries?" the jury
responded, "No." (R Vol. II, p. 379, 382.) Judgment was entered (R Vol. II, p. 384) and
this appeal followed. (R Vol. II, p. 386.)

ARGUMENT

I.

MULFORD WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO JUROR TAYLOR

Mulford waived any challenge for cause to Juror #29, Lorin Taylor, based on Mr.
Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific or his alleged bias. Mulford failed to preserve
this issue for appeal, and the jury verdict should be upheld.
Cause challenges to prospective jurors are governed by Rule 47 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure. That rule makes clear that it is the responsibility of a party, not the
court, to raise a challenge for cause, and to do so timely. The rule provides:
Challenges for cause may be made by an attorney at any time
while questioning a prospective juror, or no later than the
2

conclusion of all questions propounded to an individual
prospective juror, or the prospective jury if questioned as a
whole, except that a challenge for cause may be permitted by
the court at a later time upon a showing of good cause.
Challenges for cause, as provided by law, must be tried by the
court.
I.R.C.P.47(i)(2).

A. Mulford waived any challenge for cause based on Juror Taylor's
"relationship" to Union Pacific
Though he now makes much of Juror Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific,
Mulford did not challenge Juror Taylor for cause on this ground. During voir dire, Juror
Taylor, disclosed in response to a question by the trial court that his father was an
employee of Union Pacific. 1 (T p. 61, LL. 20-21. (Cited Transcript excerpts are attached
to this Brief as Addendum A.)) The trial court asked Taylor, "Is there anything about that
relationship that he [Taylor's father] has at the railroad that would cause you to be biased
in this case or could you listen [to] the evidence and decide this case fairly?" (T p. 62,

IMulford states that Mr. Taylor's brother, grandfathers, and three uncles also worked for
Union Pacific. (Plaintiffs Op. Br. at 19.) Mulford cites as support a section of the
transcript that does not identifY which potential juror is speaking. (T p. 112, LL. 6-15.)
However, the Court cannot "speculate on something the record does not show." Pierson
v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 533, 768 P.2d 792, 796 (Ct. App. 1989) (court cannot evaluate
argument on appeal that tone and gestures used in cross-examination constituted attack
on credibility triggering right to offer evidence of character for truthfulness because
record did not reflect tone or gestures).
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LL. 1-4.) Taylor responded, "I can help decide it fairly." (T p. 62, LL. 5-6.) The trial
court then asked the parties if they had "[a]ny challenge for cause at this point in time."
(T p. 65, LL. 2-3.) Mulford's attorney replied, "Not at this point, Your Honor." (T p. 65,
L. 5.)
Rule 47(h) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the grounds for
challenge for cause. 2 The grounds include, "Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree to any party." I.R.C.P. 47(h)(2). "Consanguinity is blood relationship by birth;
affinity is relationship by marriage. The outer limits of relationship to the fourth degree
include great aunts and uncles, first cousins, and grand nieces and nephews." Idaho Trial
Handbook § 6: 17 (2d ed.).
How blood relationship by birth could possibly apply to a juror whose father is an
employee of a defendant corporation is a puzzling issue Mulford does not address.
Mulford does not present any case law applying the consanguinity concept to a corporate
party, and Union Pacific has found none. Whatever Mulford's unexpressed rationale for
believing that Rule 47(h)(2) applies here, his argument fails because he did not raise a
challenge for cause at trial. When the trial court asked the parties whether they had any

2Mulford also relies on Idaho Code Sections 19-2019 and 19-2020, which establish
statutory grounds for implied bias that may form the basis of a challenge for cause in a
criminal case. The statutes do not apply in this civil case.
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challenges for cause, Mulford's attorney replied, "Not at this point, Your Honor." (T p.
65, L. 5.) Neither at that point nor at any other point did Mulford's attorney raise a
challenge for cause based on Juror Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific. At the
conclusion of voir dire, Mulford passed the panel for cause. (R Vol. II, p. 368; T p. 122,
LL. 6-8.) When the jury was seated, the trial court asked the parties if they had any
objection to the jury as seated. (T p. 131, L. 20-22.) Mulford's attorney answered in the
negative. (T p. 131, LL. 23-24.)
In Morris v. Thomson, this Court considered a case in which the plaintiff had
"failed to challenge for cause the majority of [the] jurors" that he argued on appeal
should have been excluded from the jury because they had a business relationship with
the defendant physician. 130 Idaho 138, 141,937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). This Court
held, "[w]ith regard to the ... jurors plaintiff failed to challenge, plaintiff waived all
objections to them by passing them for cause." Id. This Court further held that the
plaintiff's waiver was a failure to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. Because Mulford did
not raise a challenge for cause at trial, Mulford waived this point of error.
B. Mulford waived any challenge for cause based on alleged bias

Likewise, Mulford waived any challenge to Juror Taylor based on bias. After the
trial court's voir dire questioning, Mulford's attorney questioned the panel. He directed
5

the following question to the entire panel: "The law allows pain and suffering to be
compensable. That's the judge's instruction that that's one of the items of damages. Are
there any of you who would say, no, Ijust won't give you that, Mr. Larsen and Mr.
Mulford, no matter what you do?" (T p. 87, LL. 8-12.) Mr. Taylor raised his hand. (T p.
87, L. 13.) Mr. Taylor and Mulford's counsel then had this exchange:
Potential Juror #29 [Lorin Taylor]: It's more personal
opinion that I do believe that if somebody' s going to be
covered for lost wages, compensation, hospital bills and stuff
like that, why further it for pain and suffering? I was injured
on the workforce too. I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any
money. And that's okay, because there's programs out there
for everything. And, you know, I got my lost wages, but I
didn't get any pain and suffering. But the hospital bills were
paid.
Mr. Larsen: So in this case for an item of damage of pain
and suffering could you follow the law? And if the law in fact
supports that Mr. Mulford is entitled to money damages for
pain and suffering could you award that given your
experience?
Potential Juror #29: I don't believe so.
Mr. Larsen: You couldn't be fair to Mr. Mulford on that
issue no matter what?
Potential Juror #29: I believe that I can be fair on both sides.
Pain and suffering is one thing but if he still gets lost wages,
retirement, and hospital bills covered, that's a lot of pain and
suffering in itself right there.
6

Mr. Larsen: They're separate damages. And that's why I ask
this, because I want to make sure they're going to be fair on
every aspect of this. And ifthere's a certain aspect of damage
that you just say I don't believe it, cowboy up and move on, I
want to know that. That would be an indication that you may
not be able to follow the judge's instructions.
Potential Juror #29: Okay. Yeah. I don't believe that pain
and suffering should be entered for compensation.
(T p. 87, L. 20-p. 89, L. 4.)
After this exchange, Mulford's attorney made a motion to remove Mr. Taylor for
cause. (T p. 89, LL. 5-6.) In response, the trial court rehabilitated Mr. Taylor as follows:

The Court: Just a second. Let me ask a question. Mr. Taylor,
in this particular case, the judge dictates or tells the jury what
the law in Idaho is, what the duties are, what the
responsibilities of the parties are to each other, and what the
damages are that can be awarded if the evidence supports it.
If I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are
compensable and you believe that the evidence supported
those items of damage, would you follow my instructions and
award the damages that you think the evidence would
support?
Potential Juror #29: Yes.
The Court: Okay. Thank you. You may proceed.
Mr. Larsen: And that would include an item for pain and
suffering?

7

Potential Juror #29: Okay. Like I said, just a personal
opmlOnsoMr. Larsen: Okay. I appreciate that.
(T p. 89, L. 8-p. 90, L. 3.)
Mulford's counsel elected not to renew his challenge to Mr. Taylor for cause. (T p.
90, L. 13.) He continued his questioning of other potential jurors and, shortly thereafter,
stated, "Okay, I don't have anything else, Your Honor." (T p. 91, LL. 15-16.)
As stated above, at the conclusion of voir dire, Mulford's counsel passed the panel
for cause without renewing his challenge to Mr. Taylor. (R Vol. II, p. 368; T p. 122, LL.
6-8.) The parties exercised their peremptory challenges. (T p. 130, LL. 23-25.) Mulford's
counsel failed to use a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor was seated
and the trial court asked the parties if they had any objection to the jury as seated. (T p.
131, LL. 13-14; p. 131, LL. 20-22.) Mulford's attorney answered in the negative. (T p.
131, LL. 23-24.) Mr. Taylor served as the Presiding Juror. (R Vol. II, pp. 380, 383.)
Under Rule 47 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds for a cause
challenge to a potential juror include "existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing
enmity or bias to or against either party." LR.C.P. 47(h)(7). Mulford challenged Mr.
Taylor for cause based on bias, but Juror Taylor then assured the trial court that he could
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be fair. Far from lecturing Mr. Taylor that he must do what he was told, or instructing
him that he was not a dog but a cat, (PI's Op. Br. at 21), the trial court asked Mr. Taylor
an open ended question: "If I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are
compensable and you believe that the evidence supported those items of damage, would
you follow my instructions and award the damages that you think the evidence would
support?" (T p. 89, LL. 15-20.) Mr. Taylor unequivocally responded, "Yes." (T p. 89, L

21.)
The trial court acted properly in rehabilitating Mr. Taylor. "'[A] trial court does
not abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during voir
dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court that they will
be able to remain fair and impartial.'" Nightengale v. Timmel151 Idaho, 345, 353,256
P.3d 755, 761 (2011) (quoting Morris, 130 Idaho at 141, 937 P.2d at 1215). "[T]he court
is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning partiality or bias." Id.
After Mr. Taylor assured the trial court that he would follow the court's
instructions and award the damages the evidence would support, Mulford raised no
further challenge for cause and ultimately passed the jury, including Mr. Taylor, for
cause. Mulford chose not to exercise one of his four peremptory challenges to strike Juror
Taylor. This alone is fatal to his argument on appeal. "[R]efusing to grant a challenge for
9

cause 'is grounds for reversal only if the [party] exhausts all peremptory challenges and
an incompetent juror is forced upon him.'" Id. at 354, 256 P.3d at 762 (quoting 47
AmJur.2d Jury 2 § 205 (2006)). Thus, even when a party must use a peremptory
challenge to strike a juror that should have been excused for cause by the trial court, this
alone is not grounds for reversal. "[T]he party must [also] show on appeal that 'he was
prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory challenge to remove [the juror].'" Id.
(quoting State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1991) (final alteration
in original)). This requires a showing that '''remaining jurors on the panel were not
impartial or were biased.'" Id. (quoting Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570,808 P.2d at 1315).
To have an appealable issue, Mulford must have first exercised a peremptory
challenge to strike Mr. Taylor and then demonstrated to this Court that he suffered
prejudice because a member of the actual jury was incompetent. Mulford has done
neither. He chose not to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor, and has not
attempted to demonstrate on appeal that some other member of the jury was incompetent.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated with respect to a similar situation, "We can infer
from these facts that the jury was satisfactory ... at the outset of trial." State v. Hoffman,
109 Idaho 127, 130, 705 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Ct. App. 1985) (criminal defendant failed to
show that he was deprived of impartial jury where his experienced trial counsel neither
10

challenged the juror in question for cause, nor peremptorily removed juror, nor showed
evidence of juror bias or misconduct during trial). This Court should not consider
Mulford's hindsight claim of error. The trial court did not "ignore[] its duty," as Mulford
argues. (PI's Op. Br. at 20.) Mulford simply failed to raise a timely challenge for cause
pursuant to Rule 47. He waived this point of error and is not entitled to a new trial.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY
BENEFITS AFTER MULFORD OPENED THE DOOR

The trial court's ruling that Mulford opened the door to evidence that his disability
benefits influenced his mitigation efforts was a proper exercise of the court's discretion,
as was the court's denial of Mulford's motion for a new trial on the same grounds.

A. The trial COUlt reserved ruling on Mulford's pretrial motion to exclude
evidence of RRB benefits
Mulford filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence of "[c]ollateral
source benefits." (R Vol. I, p. 21.) At the time of trial, Mulford was receiving disability
benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board. (R Vol. I, p. 185.) The United States
Railroad Retirement Board ("RRB") is a governmental entity that administers retirement
and disability benefits for railroad employees. (R Vol. II, p. 198-99.) Mulford argued in
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his pretrial motion in limine that evidence that he received RRB benefits was
inadmissible under the collateral source rule. (R Vol. I, p. 185.)
In support of his motion, Mulford filed a copy of the transcript of the second of
two depositions he gave in the case. (R Vol. I, p. 82.) Despite his duty to mitigate his
damages and work full time, if possible, Mulford testified in his deposition that he only
wanted to work part time because he did not want to jeopardize his RRB benefits. The
exchange was as follows:
Q:

[W]hy is it you told him you only wanted to work parttime?

A:

Because it didn't pay enough money to make it worth
my while, but if I could work part-time, I could
supplement my income.

Q:

How much would they have to pay to make it worth
your while?

A:

Well, I think-

MR. [LARSEN]: And I'm going to object to the form of the
question as it calls for collateral source
infonnation. But you can answer.
A:

I believe the social security says I can make $780 a
month.

Q:

Before you start losing RRB Payments?

12

A:

Yes. If I make a penny over that, I lose the whole
month.

Q:

I see. So what you're saying is that, as a full-time job
at Ron's Rocky Mountain, they didn't pay enough to
make up for you losing your RRB payments; is that
right?

A:

(Witness nodded head.)

Q:

Is that right?

A:

Right.

Q:

Okay. And so you wanted to find ajob that you could
make something less than $780 a month?

A:

Yes.

(R Vol. I, pp. 94-95.)
Because of this testimony, the parties and the trial court all were aware that, if
Mulford gave affirmative testimony about why he was only interested in part-time work,
Mulford's receipt ofRRB benefits would become admissible. The trial court issued a
written order reserving ruling on Mulford's motion until trial. (R Vol. II, p. 306.)

B. The trial court permitted evidence of disability benefits after Mulford
opened the door
Mulford was the first trial witness. (T p. 135, LL. 15-17. (Cited Transcript
excerpts are attached to this Brief as Addendum A.)) During direct examination, he
13

opened the door to evidence of disability benefits when he gave a misleading answer in
response to his own attorney's question about his efforts to find employment.
Q.

Have you looked for any other employment?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

What have you looked for?

A.

I've looked for a lot of part-time work because I would
like to get into finding out how I would be able to
work or if I could even work. So I've applied to a lot
of auto parts stores, Converges, Sears. I can't
remember everything, but-Home Depot.

(T p. 201, L. 17-p. 202, L. 1.)
On cross-examination, Mulford testified:
Q.

[Y]ou told the jury that you've been applying for parttime jobs?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that the reason that you were applying for parttime jobs is because you wanted to see if you're able
to do the job and maybe work full-time, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That's not the only reason that you're applying for
part-time jobs is it?

(T p. 250, LL. 13-22.)
14

Mulford's counsel objected that "this raises an issue that we addressed in our
motion in limine." (T p. 250, LL. 23-25.) Union Pacific responded that Mulford had
opened the door to the evidence. The trial court overruled Mulford's objection. (T p. 251,
LL. 1-3.) Counsel for Union Pacific rephrased the question and, without further objection
from Mulford's counsel, Mulford testified:
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, it's not the only
reason, is it? It's not just because you want to see if you're
physically able to do the job. There's another reason that
you're only applying for part-time work isn't there?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that?

A.

Because I'm limited to only so much amount of money
to make.

(T p. 251, LL. 4-12.)
Union Pacific then asked follow-up questions to which Mulford's counsel objected
only on grounds of relevance and that the question had been asked and answered. (T p.
252, LL. 1-2.) The objections were overruled and Mulford elaborated, "I can make $780
a month, and if I make any over that 1 lose my retirement." (T p. 252, LL. 5-15.)
Mulford testified further:

15

Q.

And you testified in your deposition that you only
applied for part-time work?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you said it was because they didn't pay enough
money to make it worthwhile. Do you recall that
testimony?

A.

To lose my-no, yes, it's true.

Q.

The full-time job?

A.

The full-time job.

Q.

Didn't pay enough money to make it worth your
while?

(T p. 252, L. 24-p. 253, L. 9.)
Mulford's counsel objected, again on grounds of relevance and that the question
had been asked and answered. The trial court overruled the objections. (T p. 253, LL. 1014.) Counsel for Union Pacific restated the question and, again without further objection
from Mulford's counsel, Mulford testified:
Q.

Why is it that full-time work at Ron's Automotive
otherwise would not be something that you would
want?

A.

Because it makes less money than what I'm getting on
my retirement.

16

(T p. 253, L. 22-p. 254, L. 1.)
Mulford's counsel then moved to strike the testimony and the trial court denied the
motion. (T p. 254, LL. 3-5.)

C. The trial court denied Mulford's motion for new trial
Although the only objections raised were relevance and repetition, Mulford moved
for a mistrial on the ground that the trial court should have excluded the evidence under a
Rule 403 balancing test. (T p. 257, LL. 23-25.) The trial court heard argument outside the
presence of the jury and denied the motion, reasoning as follows:
THE COURT: The reason that I sustained--or overruled
your objections is that your-if Mr. Mulford had not testified
on direct examination as to the reason he was only looking for
part-time work, then none of that would have come in. But
once you asked him that question and he said the reason that
he only went for part-time work is because-the only reason
is because he wanted to see if he could do it, that opened the
door. The defendant at that point in the time is certainly
entitled to identifY for the jury that he's got other reasons that
he does not-he's only seeking part-time work. That'smitigation is an issue here. I wouldn't have allowed it based
on my earlier rulings except for the fact that that's how he
testified on direct. That's the problem.
(T p. 257, LL. 4-19.)
The trial court later ruled that Mulford's testimony that he would lose his
retirement ifhe made more than $780 a month was beyond the scope of Union Pacific's
17

question and was not responsive. The trial court offered to strike that portion of the
testimony or give a cautionary instruction. Mulford declined. (T p. 321, L. 21-p. 322, L.
25.) Nevertheless, the trial court would not permit Union Pacific to use the testimony on
the substantive issue of damages, but only to comment on Mulford's credibility. (T p.
323, LL. 1-18.)
The trial court reasoned as follows:
My view is that the testimony of the plaintiff as it went
to the reasons for-the reasons that he was not seeking
anything more than part-time work goes to his credibility.
Because he offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full
explanation.
And because I felt that he'd opened the door on that I
allowed the defendant to inquire are there any other reasons
and he offered the testimony that he did. We talked about it as
RRB. He never said Railroad Retirement Benefits. He just
said retirement benefits or benefits or something like that.
And so they don't know what it is or how much it is,3 and we
have the testimony of Mr. Opp4 that ifhe had workedcontinued to work until age 66, he could have put more
3Mulford argues that "[i]t is clear" that Juror Taylor, "with his background and
knowledge of UP obviously informed and instructed the jury that Mr. Mulford was
receiving RRB benefits culminating in its decision to render its verdict against him." (PI's
Op. Br. at 25.) This is neither clear nor obvious. In fact, there is no record support for
Mulford's assertion. Nevertheless, the trial court limited Union Pacific's use of the
testimony concerning retirement benefits to the non-substantive issue of credibility and
offered to issue a cautionary instruction, which Mulford declined.
4Mr. Opp was Mulford's expert economist. He presented Mulford's damages calculations
to the jury.
18

money into the retirement benefit, and he's lost that. So I
think that's kind of offset I think in terms of the testimony ...
So my view is that his testimony goes to his
credibility, but it doesn't-it's not substantive in the sense of
what are his damages, which is really what the mitigation
question is.
And so for those reasons I'm ruling that the defendant
when they call [the vocational rehabilitation expert] may not
have him refer to any ofthe reasons that he was only seeking
part-time work, may not refer to any of his railroad retirement
disability benefits in any way, in any dollar amount, can't
even make any mention of it. ...
And I'm not going to allow the defendant to argue that
in closing argument either.
(T p. 321, L1. 24-p. 322,1. 16; p. 323, L1. 7-18; p. 323, 1. 24-p. 324,1. 1; see also T p.
263, 1. 24-p. 2641. 20.)
D. This Court reviews the trial court's admission of evidence of RRB
benefits and denial of Mulford's motion for new trial for abuse of
discretion
Mulford argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
disability benefits and denying his motion for a new trial. To prevail, Mulford must show
both that the trial court's rulings were an abuse of discretion and that the errors affected a
substantial right. Hurtado v. Land o 'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012)
("'Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the
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party is affected.'" (quoting Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,
574,903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)); Stoddard v. Nelson, 991 Idaho 293,298,581 P.2d 339,
344 (1978) ("[g]ranting or denying a motion for new trial is within the discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion");
Hurtado, 153 Idaho 13,278 P.3d at 420 (court "'will grant a new trial only if the error
affected a substantial right'" (quoting State ex ref. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd.
P'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 726, 228 P.3d 985,993 (2010)); see also I.R.E. 103(a); I.R.C.P.
61. Mulford cannot meet this burden.
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court follows the
following three-part analysis:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason.
State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 686,273 P.3d 1271, 1279 (2012) (reviewing
evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion).
As discussed in detail below, Mulford's argument fails because the trial court
reached its rulings by an exercise of reason consistent with applicable legal standards.
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Further, Mulford cannot demonstrate that he suffered impairment of a substantial right
because the challenged rulings relate to damages. In this case, the jury found that Union
Pacific was not negligent. Consequently, it did not reach the issue of damages. Allegedly
erroneous rulings related to damages do not affect a substantial right when the jury does
not reach the question of damages. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 355,256 P.3d at 763.
"[T]herefore even if [the trial court's] rulings were error, such errors were harmless." Id.

E. Neither Idaho Law nor the Eichel opinion shields Mulford from vigorous
cross-examination to rebut misleading testimony

Mulford's affirmative testimony on direct examination made his receipt of RRB
benefits relevant rebuttal evidence. Idaho law clearly recognizes that otherwise
inadmissible evidence becomes admissible for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal when
the plaintiff's affirmative testimony opens the door. 5 State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,
512-13,988 P.2d 1170, 1186-87 (1999) (in murder trial, direct testimony that, before

Section 6-1606 of the Idaho Code, cited by Mulford, (PI's Op. Br. at 22), provides for
post-judgment setoff of collateral source benefits. The statute is inapplicable because the
issue of damages in FELA cases is governed by federal law. Norfolk & w. Ry. Co. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1980).
Further, Union Pacific does not concede that RRB benefits are collateral source
benefits. Benefits received from the Railroad Retirement disability system are not
compensation that is independent of the railroad employer. Rather, these benefits are
funded by a substantial contribution of the employer. The Eichel decision did not
consider this point, as the issue was not before the Court. Nevertheless, some court
opinions have referred to RRB benefits as "collateral source" benefits.
5
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murders for which he was charged, defendant had never fired murder weapon, pointed a
gun at anyone, or seen anyone shot opened door to prior bad acts evidence); State v.

Mace, 133 Idaho 903,906,994 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 2000) (in DUI trial, direct
testimony that defendant did not drink and drive opened door to prior DUI conviction);

State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 162, 898 P2d 615,621 (Ct. App. 1995) (in child abuse
trial, direct testimony that defendant had never engaged in inappropriate discipline
opened door to prior bad acts evidence). Evidence of collateral source payments is not
exempt from this basic rule of evidence. Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 535-36, 768
P.2d 792, 798-99 (Ct. App. 1989) (evidence of life insurance coverage properly admitted
in wrongful death case to rebut claim of diminished income resulting from spouse's
death).
Federal cases addressing admissibility of evidence of disability benefits in FELA
cases likewise recognize that evidence ofRRB benefits is admissible when, as here, the
plaintiff opens the door by offering misleading testimony on direct examination. In Eichel

v. New York Central Railroad Co., the United States Supreme Court held that "the
likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of' evidence that a plaintiff
in an FELA case receives benefits under the federal Railroad Retirement Act. 375 U.S.
253,255 (1963) (per curiam). However, unlike this case, the plaintiff in Eichel "had not
22

affirmatively testified in such a manner as to warrant any effort at contradiction by crossexamination. Instead, defendant there attempted to introduce prejudicial evidence of
disability pension payments simply because it was logically relevant on the extent and
duration of the plaintiffs disability." Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480,483
(3rd Cir. 1967).
Contrary to Mulford's argument, Eichel does not require the per se exclusion of
evidence ofRRB benefits in FELA cases. McGrath v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 136 F.3d
838, 841 (lst Cir. 1998) ("[W]e do not believe that the Eichel court established a brightline rule barring the admission of collateral source evidence on the issue of
malingering."); Moses v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.3d 413,416 (8th Cir. 1995) ("where
plaintiff s case itself has made the existence of collateral sources of probative value, we
have allowed proof of them"). Indeed, "[t]he barriers which have been created against the
admission of otherwise relevant evidence because of its prejudicial effect do not extend
to the affirmative volunteering by a plaintiff of testimony which breaks into this restricted
area." Gladden, 385 F.2d at 483-84; accord Lange v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 703 F.2d
322, 324 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("scope of pennissible inquiry is set by the direct
examination and the usual rules on cross-examination apply"); Ferren v. National R.R.

Passenger Corp., No. 00C2262, 2001 WL 1607586, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,2001)
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(unpublished disposition attached to this Brief as Addendum B) ("the limitation created
by the collateral source rule has itself a significant limitation"). Therefore, the fact that
Mulford testified on direct examination in such a manner as to warrant an effort on the
part of Union Pacific at contradiction by cross-examination is dispositive of this issue on
appeal.
Evidence ofRRB benefits becomes admissible when, as here, "the plaintiffs
direct testimony misleads the jury on some issue in the case and cross-examination ofthe
plaintiff on evidence of collateral source payments is necessary to rebut the testimony."
Lange, 703 F.2d at 324. For example, evidence of benefits payments made to a plaintiff

or on his behalf "may be admissible if the plaintiff puts his financial status at issue."
Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265,273 (2nd Cir. 1996); Moore v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 825 S.W.2d 839, 842-43 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (evidence of

benefits admissible after plaintiff opened door by testifYing that he could not afford
physical therapy). Similarly, if "a plaintiff asserts that he does not have [insurance]
coverage, then the defense may show that he does." Moses, 64 F.3d at 416. And "if a
plaintiff is claiming emotional injury on account of financial stress following an accident,
then defendant may inquire into collateral sources since these, ifthere are any, would
tend to reduce the plaintiffs stress." ld.
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In Lange v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, the plaintiff railroad employee
testified on direct examination that he had returned to work immediately after surgery
because he had no savings or disability income to support himself and his family while
offwork. 703 F.2d at 323-24. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in a per curiam
opinion that evidence of benefits payments plaintiff had received while off work "was
relevant to test the credibility of plaintiff s assertion that he had to return to work
immediately after surgery because he had no disability income. It was also necessary to
protect the full range of inquiry allowed by cross-examination, a fundamental part of the
adversary system." Id. at 324.
Similarly, in Gladden v. P. Henderson & Company, the plaintiff testified that he
had not returned to see a physician because he had gotten behind on his bills while he
was offwork. 385 F.2d at 482. He testified that he had gone back to work to catch up on
his bills and support his family. Id. During cross-examination, defendant's counsel sought
to introduce evidence that plaintiff had received disability benefits while he was offwork.
Id. The trial court admitted the evidence and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Id. at 483.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the
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plaintiff on direct examination brought into the case an
additional, affirmative element by testifying that he had
returned to work and had not visited [his physician] again
because he had fallen behind in the payment of his bills and
wanted to catch up on them and support his family. Defendant
was not required to leave this testimony unchallenged and had
the right to ask plaintiff on cross-examination whether he had
received financial assistance, as affecting the credibility of his
assertion. To have forbidden such cross-examination would
have conferred on plaintiff the unparalleled right to give
testimony on direct examination with immunity from inquiry
on cross-examination. This is what distinguishes the present
case from Eichel[.]
Id.; accord Crowther v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 680 F.3d 95, 100 (1st Cir. 2012)

(plaintiffs own testimony "elevated the benefits evidence from merely circumstantial to
a component of direct evidence of purposeful malingering").
Just as the plaintiffs in the Gladden and Lange decisions, Mulford's direct
testimony misled the jury, and cross-examination on evidence ofRRB benefits was
necessary to rebut the testimony. Mulford argues on appeal that the trial court ruled that
he had opened the door to evidence ofRRB benefits simply by testifying that he had
looked for part-time work. (PI's Op. Br. at 24.) Mulford's argument is not supported by
the record.
With knowledge of Mulford's deposition testimony that he was seeking only parttime work to avoid jeopardizing his retirement benefits, Mulford's attorney asked him
26

during direct examination what jobs he had looked for. Mulford responded, "I've looked
for a lot of part-time work because] would like to get into finding out how] would be

able to work or if] could even work." (T p. 201, LL. 20-23 (emphasis added).) As the
trial court ruled, Mulford "offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full explanation." (T
p. 322, LL. 2-4.) His misleading testimony suggested to the jury that, because of his
injury, he may not be physically capable of working a full-time job. Unchallenged,
Mulford's misleading testimony had a strong potential to unfairly gain the jurors'
sympathy by exaggerating the severity of his injuries, thereby increasing an award of
damages. His affirmative testimony made his receipt of disability benefits relevant
rebuttal evidence.
In denying Mulford's motion for mistrial, the trial court ruled that,
if Mr. Mulford had not testified on direct examination as to
the reason he was only lookingfor part-time work, then none
of that would have come in. But once you asked him that
question and he said the reason that he only went for parttime work is because-the only reason is because he wanted
to see if you could do it, that opened the door. The defendant
at that point in time is certainly entitled to identify for the jury
that he's got other reasons that he does not-he's only
seeking part-time work.
(T p. 257, LL. 5-15 (emphasis added)).
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The trial court's ruling and reasoning are fully consistent with the FELA
decisions, including the Gladden decision, in which the court ruled:
If plaintiff had not added his affirmative testimony on direct
examination he would have had the advantage of the
collateral benefit rule and the jury would have been required
to assess his damages without any knowledge of the collateral
benefit he received .... But the collateral benefit rule cannot
be made a springboard from which a plaintiff may go forward
with affirmative evidence that he returned to work while he
was still ailing, because of financial need and then seek
immunity from cross-examination regarding it. The boundary
of silence was crossed when plaintiff affirmatively presented
on direct examination the reason why he had returned to work
after seven weeks and had not again visited his physician. The
trial court therefore was justified in opening the door for
cross-examination for the narrow purpose of testing the
credibility of plaintiff s assertion.
385 F.2d at 484.
The trial court offered to strike the portion of Mulford's testimony in which he
told the jury how much monthly income would result in a loss of his retirement benefits.
The trial court also offered to issue a cautionary instruction to the jury. "Trial courts can
minimize any prejudice ... by offering to give a cautionary instruction .... Historically
this Court has expressed its confidence that juries will follow such a cautionary
instruction." Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 834, 828 P.2d 854, 862 (Idaho 1992)
(voir dire questions about insurance company advertisement concerning effect of jury
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verdicts on insurance costs permissible with cautionary instruction). Nevertheless,
Mulford declined both offers. (T p. 322, LL. 20-25.)
Though Mulford did not request it, the trial court limited Union Pacific's use of
the evidence ofRRB benefits to the issue of Mulford's credibility. (T p. 324, LL. 2-17.)
If there was any potential for unfair prejudice associated with admission of the evidence,
it was eliminated by the trial court's careful ruling that the evidence could not be used for
any substantive purpose.
Mulford opened the door to evidence that receipt of disability benefits affected his
efforts to mitigate his damages by finding other employment. It was within the trial
court's discretion to permit cross-examination on the issue for the narrow purpose of
testing Mulford's credibility. The trial court's evidentiary ruing and subsequent denial of
Mulford's motion for new trial were supported by an exercise of reason and were
consistent "with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it."

Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 686,273 P.3d at 1279. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Nevertheless, even ifthe trial court's rulings were erroneous, Mulford did not
suffer impairment of a substantial right. The jury found that Union Pacific was not
negligent. Therefore, it never reached the question of damages. For this reason, the trial
court's rulings, even if erroneous, were harmless. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 355,256
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P.3d at 763. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings and the jury verdict should
stand.

III.

MULFORD

Is NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

Mulford is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. Under Idaho law,
attorney fees can be awarded on appeal only to a prevailing party, and only when the
appeal was defended "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." MBNA Am.
Bank, NA. v McGoldrick, 148 Idaho 56,60,218 P.3d 785, 789 (2008). Union Pacific's
defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Substantial competent
authority supports Union Pacific's positions on appeal. This Court should decline
Mulford's invitation to enter an award of attorney fees in his favor.

CONCLUSION

Mulford has presented no grounds for overturning the verdict rendered by the jury
in this case. First, Mulford did not raise a challenge for cause to Juror Taylor based on a
"relationship" to Union Pacific. Mulford raised but then abandoned a challenge for cause
to Juror Taylor based on bias. He passed the jury for cause and then elected not to use a

30

peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor. Mulford waived any challenge to Juror Taylor
and is not entitled to a new trial.
Second, Mulford opened the door to the admissibility of evidence that he received
disability benefits when, during direct examination, he gave a misleading explanation for
his choice to search for only part-time work. In a proper exercise of discretion, the trial
court permitted cross-examination on the issue for the narrow purpose of testing
Mulford's credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence
or denying Mulford's motion for new trial. Nevertheless, if the trial court's rulings were
erroneous, the errors were harmless because they related to an issue the jury did not
reach. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings.
Finally, this Court should deny Mulford's request for attorney fees. Union
Pacific's defense of this appeal is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Substantial competent authority supports Union Pacific's positions.
For these reasons, Union Pacific urges this Court to reject Mulford's arguments on
appeal and uphold the trial court's rulings and the jury's verdict.
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DATED this 8th day of April, 2013.

Steven T. Densley
RehaKamas
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Union Pacific Railroad Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY that on the 8th day of April, 2013, a copy of the foregoing was
served in the manner indicated below upon the following:

x

Reed W. Larsen
Javier Gabiola
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivered
-_ _ Overnight
- - Facsimile
- - No Service
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1607586, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,2001)
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CRAIG L. MULFORD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)

)
)

vs.

Supreme Court No.
39991-2012

)

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)

Bannock County
Court No.
2009-4313-PI

)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
the County of Bannock, Stephen S.
District Judge, presiding.

Sheila Fish
RPR, CSR

Dunn,

in and for

1

Employer's Liability Act which allows the plaintiff

1

THE COURT: Is there anything about that

2

to bring this claim against the railroad.

2

relationship that he has at the railroad that would

3

cause you to be biased in this case or could you

4

you, do either of you know anything more about this

4

listen the evidence and decide this case fairly?

5

case from any source?

5

Other than what I've just explained to

3

6

POTENTIALJUROR #41: No.

6

7

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

7

8

THE COURT: Are either of you acquainted

8

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I can help decide it
fairly.
THE COURT: Okay. Have either of you ever
been a party to a civil lawsuit?

9

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

10

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

10

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

11

POTENTIALJUROR #29: No.

11

THE COURT: Any party ever complained

THE COURT: Do you have any kind of

12

9

with any family member of either party?

12

against you in a criminal case?

13

relationship with the parties such as

13

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

14

employer/employee, debtor/creditor, attorney/client,

14

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

15

master/servant, that kind of a relationship?

15

THE COURT: Have you formed or expressed any

16

POTENTIALJUROR #41: No.

16

17

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes.

17

18

THE COURT: Tell me what your relationship

18

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

19

THE COURT: All right. Do you have a

19
20
21
22

is.
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: My father's an
employee of Union Pacific.
THE COURT: Your father's an employee of the

opinion about this case before today?
POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

20

particular state of mind with regard to claims of

21

this type that makes you biased as you sit here right

22

now?

23

railroad. All right. And so you don't have that

23

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

24

relationship. Your father does.

24

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

25

THE COURT: Do either one of you know any of

25

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes.
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1

the lawyers, the lawyers representing the railroad,

1

2

Mr. Densely and Mr. Hayden, or for the plaintiff,

2

3

Mr. Larsen and Mr. Gabiola?

THE COURT: You don't have any personal
stake in the outcome of the case?

3

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

4

POTENTIALJUROR #29: No.

4

POTENTIALJUROR #29: No.

5

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

5

THE COURT: Have you previously served on a

6

THE COURT: All right. Let's see. I need

6

jury in your life?

7

to read some names: Craig Mulford, Carol Mulford,

7

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

8

Gary Brandt, Kevin O'Neil, Dr. Wathne, Nancy Collins,

8

POTENTIALJUROR #41: No.

9

Stephen Morrissey, Michael Freeman, Jeffrey Opp, Dan

THE COURT: Are you willing to follow my

9

10

Camacho, John Baker, AI Davis, Kurt Hegmann, a

10

instructions?

11

Dr. George Page, and Bob Van Iderstine. Do either of

11

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes.

12

you know any of those witnesses?

12

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: Yes.

13

POTENTIALJUROR #29: No.

13

14

THE COURT: Who do you know?

14

reason you could not be a fair and impartial juror in

15

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I don't know.

15

this case?

16

THE COURT: Do you know any of them?

16

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

17

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: One name sounds

17

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.

18
19
20

familiar, Dan Camacho, from years ago.

THE COURT: Do you think that there's any

THE COURT: All right. And is there any

18

THE COURT: Nothing about that relationship
that would bias you today?

19

compelling circumstance going on in your life that

20

would make it impossible for you to serve on this
jury?

21

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

21

22

THE COURT: Okay. Do you know any other

22

POTENTIALJUROR #41: No.

23

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No.
THE COURT: See I should have asked all of

23

person in this panel, either one of you?

24

POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No.

24

25

POTENTIALJUROR #29: No.

25 ,you the questions that fast. It would have gone much
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1

faster.

2

that he sustained were not caused by his work and

3

were not caused by his tripping incident. Do you

4

know anything about this case at all other than me
having explained that to you?

All right. Any challenge for cause at

2
3

this point in time?
MR. DENSLEY: No, Your Honor.

4

The railroad claims that the injuries

5

MR. LARSEN: Not at this pOint, Your Honor.

5

6

THE COURT: What's your name and number,

S

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: All right. Do you know any of

7

please? Your name?

8
9

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Crystal Heath.

8

these parties or any of the lawyers or does any

THE COURT: Heath?

9

member of your family know any of them to your

10

knowledge?

10

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes.

11

MR. LARSEN: 36.

11

THE DEFENDANT #36: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At least these people are

12

THE COURT: Have you had any kind of

12
13

avoiding jail. 36, Ms. Heath, I'm going to ask you a

13

employee/employer, debtor/creditor, attorney/client

14

few questions.

14

relationship with anybody here?

15
16

Swear her in. Please stand and raise
your right hand.

17
18

(Whereupon the potential juror was
sworn.)

19

THE COURT: I'm going to ask you a few

15

THE DEFENDANT #36: No, Your Honor.

is

THE COURT: Okay. Have you ever been a

17

party in a civil lawsuit?

18

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

19

THE COURT: Have any of these parties ever

20

questions. I'm going to make it even shorter than I

20

21

just did. This is a case where Mr. Mulford is making

21

filed a criminal case against you?
POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No, Your Honor.

22

a claim against the Union Pacific for injuries he

22

23

claims to have sustained to his knees as a result of

23

24

the type of work that he was asked to do, and it's

24

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

25

because he tripped over a piece of equipment in 2009.

25

THE COURT: Can you be fair and impartial?

THE COURT: Do you have any bias or
prejudice against either party?
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2
3
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POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes.

1

circumstance in your life that would make it

THE COURT: Do you know the lawyers, any of

2

impossible for you to serve on this jury?

3

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

4

the lawyers from either side?
POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

4

THE COURT: Okay. I'm almost hoping nobody

5

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to read to you

5

6

a list of names: Craig Mulford, Carol Mulford, Gary

6

7

Brandt, Kevin O'Neil, Dr. Wathne, Nancy Collins,

7

8

Stephen Morrissey, Michael Freeman, Jeffrey Opp, Dan

8

9

Camacho, John Baker, AI Davis, Dr. Hegmann, George

9

10

Page, and Bob Van Iderstine. Do you know any of

10

11

those people?

11

12

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

12

13

THE COURT: And do you know any of these

13

14

14

people on this jury panel?

else comes in now.
All right. Now pass for cause at this
pOint?
MR. LARSEN: At this pOint, yes, Your Honor.
MR. DENSLEY: No objection.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead,
Mr. Larsen.
MR. LARSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Reed
Larsen. I introduced myself to you a little bit.

15

POTENTIALJUROR #36: No.

15

I'm going to ask you some questions, and I don't mean

16

THE COURT: Have you previously served on a

16

to embarrass you or to pry too much, but we want to

17

find out some of your thoughts and opinions, and I

17

jury?

18

POTENTIALJUROR #36: No.

18

think it's only fair that you get some background

19

THE COURT: Will you follow my instructions,

19

from me as I ask these questions.

20

20

my instructions on the law?

I'll tell you that I live here in

21

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes.

21

Pocatello. My wife's name is Linda. She is much

22

THE COURT: And can you be fair and

22

more talented and has more ability than I do. She

23

runs Sunrise Dance Academy out in Chubbuck. We have

23

impartial in this case?

24

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes.

24

three kids. I'm a grandpa which is kind of hard to

25

THE COURT: Is there any kind of compelling

25

imagine. I didn't think that that would happen, and
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1

Iiker with something else r and it's kind of personal

2

if I can step out.

3

1
2

THE COURT: Excellent. Excellent. It's

3

good to know that. Does anybody have any problem

4

with that?

MR. LARSEN: Sure.

4

(In chambers.)

5
S

know r going through school it was really rough.

THE COURT: Tell us what your issue is.

5

MR. LARSEN: I don't have any problem.

POTENTIAL JUROR #52: I just wanted to put

6

MR. DENSLEY: No.
THE COURT: Very good. We can accommodate

7

this across. All through my school years I had a

7

8

really hard timer liker comprehending. I went

8

that.

9

throughr Iike r Resource and stuff. So I have a hard

9

(Out of chambers.)

10

timer liker remembering stuff toor so I just wanted

10

THE COURT: Continue.

11

to be fair on both of the sides.

11

MR. LARSEN: As we dealt with this topic of

12

THE COURT: Okay.

12

lawsuits are there any of you who feels like a person

13

POTENTIAL JUROR #52: So I just wanted to

13

who comes into court and seeks damages either should

14

or should not be awarded damages? In this case we're

14

bring that up.

15

THE COURT: Nobody's required to have a

15

going to be talking about lost wages from being a

16

perfect memorYr and you do have a chance to take some

16

machinist at the railroad in the past and in the

17

notes if you want to. Really it comes down to

17

future. Anyone have a hard time with that concept

18

whether you'll listen carefully to both sides r

18

that a person would be or could be entitled to

19

consider what all of the other jurors saYr and make

19

damages?

20

the fair and best decision that you think that you

20

21

can.

21

The next -- I didn't see anybody raise
their hands r so I'm assuming that that means if the

22

POTENTIAL JUROR #52: Uh-huh.

22

evidence shows that Mr. Mulford was entitled to

23

THE COURT: Can you do that?

23

damages r you'd be able to award him damages that was

24

POTENTIAL JUROR #52: I can tryr butr like I

24

consistent with the proof. Anyone have any problem

25

with that concept at all?

25

said r I just want to be honest about itr and r you
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1

The next one is pain and suffering. Are

2

there any of you who feel like if a person's been

1

And that's okaYr because is there's programs out

2

there for everything. And r you know r I got my lost

3

injured and has in this instance an injury to their

3

wages r but I didn't get any pain and suffering. But

4

knees that if they have pain and suffering that they

4

the hospital bills were paid.

5

either should or should not get any compensation for

5

6

that pain and suffering? Anyone have any problems

6

damage of pain and suffering could you follow the

7

with that concept?

7

law? And if the law r in factr supports that

8

Mr. Mulford is entitled to money damages for pain and

8
9

The law allows pain and suffering to be
compensable. That's the judge's instruction that

9

10

that's one of the items of damages. Are there any of

10

11

you who would saYr nOr I just won't give you thatr

11

12

Mr. Larsen and Mr. Mulford r no matter what you do.

12

13

THE COURT: You have a hand over here.

13

14

MR. LARSEN: Okay.

14

15

suffering r could you award that given your
experience?
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I don't believe so.
MR. LARSEN: You couldn't be fair to
Mr. Mulford on that issue no matter what?
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I believe that I can

15

be fair on both sides. Pain and suffering is one

16

thing r but if he still gets lost wages r retirement r

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Lorin Taylorr juror

17

and hospital bills covered r that's a lot of pain and

18

suffering in itself right there.

19

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

20

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: It's more personal

20

16

THE COURT: Please stand up and tell us your

MR. LARSEN: So in this case for an item of

name again.

17
18

29.

MR. LARSEN: They're separate damages. And
that's why I asked this r because I want to make sure

21

opinion that I do believe that if somebody's going to

21

that you're going be fair on every aspect of this.

22

be covered for lost wages r compensation r hospital

22

And if there's a certain aspect of damage that you

23

just say I don't believe in itr cowboy up and move

23

bills and stuff like thatr why further it for pain

24

and suffering? I was injured on the workforce too.

24

on r I want to know that. That would be an indication

25

I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any money.

25

that you may not be able to follow the judge's
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1

instructions.
2
3

believe that pain and suffering should be entered for

4

compensation.

3

MR. LARSEN: All right. I'd move for

5
6

2

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Okay. Yeah. I don't

excusing for cause, Your Honor.

4

there anyone else that has similar feelings as it
relates to an item of damage for pain and suffering?

6

You just think, you know, this is not something that
courts or juries should deal with.

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach.

7

8

THE COURT: Just a second. Let me ask a

8
9

question.

MR. LARSEN: Okay. I appreciate that. Is

5

7
9

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Okay. Like I said,
just personal opinion so --

I assume by the fact that nobody's>
raising their hands that you'll all agree that if you

10

serve as jurors and if the evidence supports it, you

11

judge dictates or tells the jury what the law in

11

can follow the judge's instructions on that item of

12

Idaho is, what the duties are, what the

12

damage.

13

responsibilities of the parties are to each other,

13

really appreciate your attention. I know it's hot in
here. I appreciate -- did you have a --

10

Mr. Taylor, in this particular case, the

14

and what the damages are that can be awarded if the

14

15

evidence supports it. If I were to instruct you that

15

16

certain items of damages are compensable and you

16

I don't have anything else. And I

POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I'm sorry, Donald

17

believe that the evidence supported those items of

17

Roth, 57. This might be a law issue, but is there a

18

damage, would you follow my instructions and award

18

measuring stick for pain and suffering that will be

19

the damages that you think the evidence would

19

taught or given? Because I think it might be

20

support?

20

subjective, mine might be different than yours.

21

POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes.

21

22

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

22

You may proceed.

23
24
25

23

MR. LARSEN: And that would include an item

24
25

for pain and suffering?

MR. LARSEN: Yeah. The measuring stick is
the collective wisdom of the jury. So that's -THE COURT: I'll instruct you as to what the
measuring stick is.
POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I'm sorry.
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THE COURT: I'll instruct you as to what

1

1

Union Pacific was negligent in asking him to do the
type of work to cause those injuries.

2

measuring stick is. You might not like it, but I'll

2

3

instruct you as to it.

3

POTENTIAL JUROR #57: That's what I was

4
5

wondering.

4

He also claims that he tripped over a
piece of equipment in March of 2009 which required

5

that he needed knee surgery or total knee replacement

6

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

6

earlier than what he otherwise would have done. The

7

MR. LARSEN: You would be willing to follow

7

railroad claims that the work did not cause

8

Mr. Mulford's knee injuries, that they were not

9

negligent in asking him to do the work that he did,

8

that, Mr. Roth?
POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I would.

9
10

MR. LARSEN: And we were neighbors sometime

10

and that his knee problems were caused by other

11

ago. Hopefully I was a good neighbor. Nothing about

11

things such as prior injuries, family problems,

12

that that would affect your ability to be fair to my

12

weight, health, age, that kind of thing.

13

client?

13

They deny that they were negligent with

14

POTENTIAL JUROR #57: Oh, not at all.

14

regard to where the piece of eqUipment -- he says the

15

MR. LARSEN: Okay. I don't have anything

15

equipment was improperly stored and that caused him

16

to trip. They say it was not improperly stored and

16
17
18
19
20

else, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Before we go to you, Mr. Densley, let me
ask Mr. Vialpando some questions.

17

that he was not paying attention to what he was

18

doing. That's the claims of the case.

19

Mr. Vialpando, as I indicated to you,

20

Do you know anything about this case
other than what I've just told you?

21

this is the case where Mr. Mulford, an employee of

21

POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Nothing at all.

22

Union Pacific, was working as a machinist, working on

22

THE COURT: All right. Are you acquainted

23

certain equipment and machinery. He claimed that the

23

with any of the parties, any of the lawyers, or any

24

activities and job requirements, working conditions

24

of their the family members?

25

of his job required surgery on his knees and that

25
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POTENTIAL JUROR #25: No, I'm not.
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1

POTENTIAL JUROR #63: No.

1

POTENTIAL JUROR #25: No, sir.

2

MR. DENSLEY: All right. Any other

2

MR. DENSLEY: Okay. So -- yes.

3

POTENTIAL JUROR: I'm not currently a member

3

responses on the knee injuries?

4

5
6
7

THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Counsel,

10

(A discussion was held off the record.)

THE COURT: What unions?

6

POTENTIAL JUROR: Operating engineers and
riders.
MR. DENSLEY: Operating engineers with the

8
9

MR. DENSLEY: All right. I think we're
gOing to go ahead and proceed then. Let me ask if

of a union but I have brothers who are.

5

7

approach.

8
9

4

Okay. At this point I think we probably
need to talk to the new juror.

railroad?

10

POTENTIAL JUROR: No. No.

11

any of you or members of your family are members of

11

MR. DENSLEY: Oh, professional engineers?

12

any kind of labor union? Can we have your raise your

12

POTENTIAL JUROR: Heavy equipment,

13

hands there?

13

14

15
16

Why don't we start with you. Is it
Mr. Vialpando?
POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Vialpando, yes.

bulldozers, backhoes.

14

MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that

15

that would impact your ability to act fairly in this

16

case?

17

MR. DENSLEY: What union is that?

17

POTENTIAL JUROR: No.

18

POTENTIAL JUROR #25: It's out of Idaho

18

THE COURT: Who was next? Yes, sir.

19

POTENTIAL JUROR #13: I worked for Simplot

19
20
21
22

Falls. It's a carpenter's union.
MR. DENSLEY: Is that you or a family
member?
POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Family member.

20

for 37 years, and I don't think it would impact my

21

decision one way or another for me.

22

MR. DENSLEY: Okay. So your experience on a

23

union wouldn't impair your ability to treat Union

24

that would impair your ability to act fairly to Union

24

Pacific fairly?

25

Pacific especially if asked in this case?

25

23

MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that

POTENTIAL JUROR #13: No.
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MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Thank you. I guess

1

POTENTIAL JUROR: Yes.
MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that

2

working back this way, who else -- anyone else on

2

3

this side raise their hand? Okay. I think I saw

3

that would impair your ability to treat Union Pacific

4

some hands over here. Yes.

4

fairly?

5

POTENTIALJUROR #17: I've got cousins and

5

POTENTIAL JUROR: No.

6

family members that are in a steel workers union and

6

MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Let's see. You next.

7

carpenters union out of California and Colorado.

7

POTENTIAL JUROR: I have a brother that's in

8
9
10

MR. DENSLEY: Anything about that that would
impair your ability to act fairly?
POTENTIALJUROR #17: No.

8

IBEW, Idaho Board of Electrical Workers, union 29.

9

My brother, my grandfather, and my father were all

10

members of Union Pacific Railroad as well as my other
grandfather and three other uncles.

11

MR. DENSLEY: Who else?

11

12

POTENTIALJUROR #31: 31, Charles Smith.

12

13

MR. DENSLEY: So anything with respect to

I'm a member of the NALC, National Association of

13

those instances or those experiences that would

14

Letter Carriers. I'm on the executive board for this

14

impair your ability to treat Union Pacific fairly?

15

local union, branch 927.

15

POTENTIAL JUROR: No.

16

MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Anyone else member of a

16

MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Is there anything about

17

your experience with the union that would impair your

17

18

ability to treat Union Pacific fairly?

18

19

POTENTIALJUROR #31: Not necessarily. I'd

union or family member?
Okay. All right. Aside from anything

19

that anyone's already mentioned, have any of you or

20

have to hear the facts. You know, if I am on a

20

any of your family members been involved in an

21

jury -- I think that I could be fair, yes, sir.

21

industrial accident or in a work related accident or
Injury? Okay. Let's start with you, sir.

22

MR. DENSLEY: All right. Thank you. Yes.

22

23

POTENTIAL JUROR: My husband's a member of

23

24
25

the union for police officers.
MR. DENSLEY: Police officers you said?
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POTENTIAL JUROR #5: Hurt my back when I was

24

working for the hospital. Slipped and fell on a

25

piece of ice.
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have two groups raise your hands. And what I'm gOing

1

you or that you don't have as much control. Oh, keep
your hands up real quick.

2

to do is just describe for you a spectrum that, you

2

3

know, all of us would fit on this spectrum.

3

4

At either end of the spectrum would be

All right. Everybody who didn't raise

4

their hands. Keep them up for just a second. All
right. Thank you very much.

5

people who people who feel like -- and I don't know

5

6

if this describes anybody, but people who feel like

6

7

they're in total control of events and that their

7

THE COURT: All right. Now, pass the jury
for cause?

8

destiny is in their own hands and everything that

8

MR. LARSEN: Yes, Your Honor.

9

happens to them is as a result of what they've done

9

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach?

10
11

and what they have chosen.

THE COURT: You may.

10

The other end of the extreme is people

11

(A discussion was held off the record.)

12

who feel like they are out of control and that events

12

THE COURT: Ms. Leyvas, you may be excused.

13

control them and they don't get to choose anything,

13

14

and events happen to them. All of us fit somewhere

14

Mr. Densley, pass the jury for cause?
MR. DENSLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

15

between, and so if I were to ask you to draw a line

15

16

right in the middle and ask you to place yourself on

16

17

one side or another, how many of you would put

17

This takes a moment, so just be patient.

THE COURT: All right. Now exercise your
peremptory challenges.

18

yourself on the side where it tends toward I am in

18

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach?

19

control of events and I can control my own destiny

19

(A discussion was held off the record.)

20

and I'm in charge? So can you all raise your own

20

21

hand if you feel like you're on that end of the

21

for a moment. I want to talk to first juror number

22

spectrum? Keep your hands up for a minute.

22

two. Mr. Strawn, would you come into chambers,

23

please?

23

All right. Now everybody raise your

24

hand if you feel like you're on the other end of the

24

25

spectrum, that events are maybe more in control of

25

THE COURT: We're going to go in chambers

(In chambers.)
THE COURT: One of the things that often
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1

comes up in a civil case -- we always ask it in a

1

2

criminal case, but we probably should ask in a civil

2

POTENTIAL JUROR: Well, I tell you what
though, ever since then anything that's been

3

case. We check people's criminal histories, and I

3

felony -- oh, like a concealed weapons permit, you

4

just need to ask you whether or not you've ever been

4

know, like everything that's felony -- my state job,

5

convicted of a felony?

5

anything that has ever asked for a felony has never

6

POTENTIAL JUROR #2: No.

6

found it. It's never popped it. It's never -- it's

7

THE COURT: Any charges in the past have

7

not like I've been lying to people about it, but I

8

tell this exact same story. I know that I got a

8
9

10
11
12

been misdemeanors?
POTENTIAL JUROR #2: Yes.

9

THE COURT: Very good. That's all I needed
to know. Thank you very much.

10

felony. I think that I was convicted of a felony,
but I also think it fell off my record pre 18.

11

Thank you, sir. One of the issues that

12

THE COURT: So you were under 18 when you
got the charge?

13

sometimes comes up in cases that we always need to

13

POTENTIAL JUROR: Correct.

14

check on is whether or not -- because sometimes

14

THE COURT: Which is very rare. Do you want

f5

people check on criminal backgrounds and so forth.

15

16

We want to check and see if you have ever been

16

17

convicted of a felony.

17

18
19

POTENTIAL JUROR: I hate to say I don't know
on this one, because I know I was convicted on a

to know anything more?
MR. DENSLEY: Any post 18 felony
convictions?

18

POTENTIAL JUROR: No felonies.

19

THE COURT: Some misdemeanors maybe?
POTENTIAL JUROR: Correct.

20

felony, but I know it was pre 18. I'm not sure the

20

21

situation of that guy. I think they dropped it at

21

22

18, and there's even a very slight possibility that I

22

where anyone has challenged your qualifications to

23

didn't get it in the first place. But I was 17 --

23

serve as a juror because you had been convicted of a

24

felony?

24
25

THE COURT: Usually a person would remember
if they've been convicted of a felony.

25
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THE COURT: Have you ever filed a motion

POTENTIAL JUROR: No.
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1
2

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. They asked me
MR. LARSEN: A withheld judgment, does that
ring any bells?

2

come back and say that I made a mistake. That should

3

have been somebody else.

4

THE COURT: A withheld judgment, do you

5
6

again. When you exercise your last peremptory, don't

what it was.

3
4

1

5

remember that?

MR. LARSEN: We had that happen, and I was
not happy.
THE COURT: No, you were not.

6

7

POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No.

7

MR. LARSEN: Doesn't make much difference.

S

THE COURT: Good for you, I guess. Thank

8

THE COURT: So my plan would be to make sure

9

you very much. I appreciate it.

9

that I've got the correct jurors, confirm it with you

10

MR. DENSLEY: I'm not aware of anyone else.

10

at the bench, pull those 13 into the box, excuse the

11

MR. LARSEN: I'm not aware of anyone else

11

rest, do a little break, and then do the pre-proof

12

instructions. I at least want to get those done

12

that's been disclosed.

13

today. Then we can start with openings and go

14

know. We'd have to do a lot of checking to find that

14

through the evidence starting at 9:00 tomorrow.

15

out, and --

15

THE COURT: The bottom line here is I don't

13

MR. DENSLEY: How long do you anticipate

16

MR. LARSEN: Odds are on her--

16

17

THE COURT: Odds are that it got dismissed.

17

going each day?
THE COURT: I'll go at least until 5:00.

18

That's the odds. I would guess, but there's no way

18

I'll go longer if I have to depending on where we are

19

of knowing for sure. I wonder -- I'll have my clerk

19

in the case. This case will be done by Friday. I

20

check.

20

can guarantee that.

21
22

(A recess was taken from 4:23 p.m. to

4:25 p.m.)

22

THE COURT: She got a dismissal. So no

23

MR. LARSEN: It should be.

21

(Out of chambers.)

23

24

disqualification. Now my plan here is, just so that

24

25

we're clear -- I don't want to have Kutler happen

25

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, you may
exercise your peremptory challenges.
Counsel approach.
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(A discussion was held off the record.)

1

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Now,

1

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and

2
3
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gentlemen, if the following individuals would come,

2

we're going to -- we're going to excuse the remainder

3

of the jurors with the exception of I want to visit

4

the marshal will seat you in the jury box in the

4

with Ms. Klinger before you -- you stay right where

5

order in which you should be seated. In this order:

5

you are for a moment. But the rest of the jurors are

6

Mr. Strawn, Mr. Binggeli -- is it Binggeli or

6

excused and we appreciate your being here.

7

Binggeli?

(Whereupon the remaining jury panel was

7

8

POTENTIAL JUROR #5: Binggeli.

8

9

THE COURT: Mr. Drawe, is that right?

9

excused.)
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Klinger, if you would

10

Mr. Richardson, Mr. Shurtliff, Mr. Apel -- is it

10

11

Apel?

11

POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Here?

12

THE COURT: Can you tell me why you did not

POTENTIAL JUROR #18: Yeah, it's Apel.

12

13

THE COURT: Okay. You're next.

13

14

Mr. Vialpando, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Smith, Mr. Davis,

14

15

Ms. Tolman.

15

THE DEFENDANT #35: Oh, yeah, there's two of

16

17

us.
THE COURT: Oh, Karen. Ms. Heath, and

18

19

Stacey Carter.
Okay. Now, the jury's been seated. Is

20

come forward, please. Right there is fine.

appear at the appropriate time today?
POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Friday I had a very bad
migraine and I didn't even call, so --

.

16

THE COURT: That's not a very good excuse.

17

POTENTIALJUROR #8: I know. I'm so sorry.
THE COURT: Because you ultimately appeared

18
19

today after being called, I'm not going to issue an

20

order to show cause and have you appear in front of

21

there any objection from either side to the jury as

21

Judge Nye and decide whether he should fine you for

22

seated?

22

not appearing today. But I am gOing to require

23

jury commissioner to put your name into the next jury

24

panel.

23
24
25

MR. LARSEN: Not from the plaintiff, Your
Honor.
MR. DENSLEY: No objection.

25
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~he

POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Okay.
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THE COURT: Next list and don't --

1

need to rearrange the courtroom a little bit and then

2

POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Don't forget.

2

get you situated in there.

3

THE COURT: Don't forget to call next time

3

Okay. So don't talk about the case with

4

each other yet at all. Can't talk about the case

5

POTENTIAL JUROR #8: All right. Thank you.

5

with each other at all during the case until it's all.

6

THE COURT: All right.

6

done. So that's going to be a blanket rule. I'll

7

give a little bit more detail with that in a minute,

8

but don't discuss the case or form an opinion. Okay.

4

or it will be serious.

7

8

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, if
you'll all stand, please, and raise your right hand.

9

(Whereupon the jury was sworn.)

10

THE COURT: Did anyone answer no? You

(A recess was taken at 4:38 p.m.)

9
10

11

better not have -- I won't say that. Okay. You may

11

12

be seated. What I'm going to do is I'm going to

12

13

briefly recess and have you go into the jury room.

13

14

If you have any issues at all, medical or anything

14

15

like that, let mister -- or Deputy Garcia know. He's

15

16

the person who takes care of all of your needs. And

16

17

so he will do that and take care of your needs. And

17

18

then -- but it's going to be very brief, because what

18

19

I want -" there's something that I want to complete

19

20

today.

20

21

We're going to give you a few

21

22

instructions before we conclude the day. And once we

22

23

get those instructions in, then we'll recess for the

23

24

day and reconvene tomorrow at 9:00. So we're going

24

25

to take a very brief recess right now for his -- we

25
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1

May 15, 2012

1

2

9:39 a.m.

2

3
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Larsen, are you
ready to call your witness?

4
5

MR. LARSEN: Mr. Gabiola will be questioning

6
7

this witness.

7

8

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gabiola.

8

MR. GABIOLA: Thank you, Your Honor. Before

9

we do that, we would like to exclude witnesses.

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GABIOLA:

Q. Can you introduce yourself to the jury

6

9
10

MR. GABIOLA: Thank you, Your Honor.

3

4
5

You may inquire.

telling them that your full name and where you live?

A. Craig Mulford. I live in Pocatello
here.

10

Q. Mr. Mulford, how old are you?

11

A. I'm 62.

12

are witnesses that are scheduled to testify in this

12

Q. Where were you born?

13

case in the courtroom they should move to the

13

A. I was born in Rosebud, South Dakota, on

14

hallway.

THE COURT: As previously ordered, if there

15

17

19

22

17

A. Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Come forward, Mr. Mulford, stand

18

Q. What tribe is that?

19

A. Rosebud Sioux Indian Tribe.

Mulford.

before the clerk and be sworn.

20
CRAIG MULFORD,

21

(The witness was sworn.)

22

23
24
25

Q. Are you a member of a federally

16

20
21

the Indian Reservation.

MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, we call Craig

16

18

14

15

Call your first witness.

THE COURT: Please be seated right here in
the witness chair, sir.
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recognized tribe?

Q. Would you provide the jury a brief
history of your educational background?

A. I quit school when I was 16, went on my

23

own. Later on I went into the service, Navy. I

24

obtained my GED, and after I was discharged from the

25

Navy I went to community college for automotive
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1

Mr. Camacho and Mr. Baker were your supervisors; is

1

but -- Home Depot.

2

that accurate?

2

Q. Have you been able to find another job?

3

A. Yes.

3

A. No, I haven't.

4

Q. Did either of them ever contact you to

4

Q. As you sit here today do you still have

5

5

ask you to come back to work as a machinist?

6

7

A. No.

6

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Did either of them ask you to submit to

7

Q. What are they?

8

A. They kind of hurt when I walk up and

8

a physical to see if you could physically go back to

9

work as a machinist?

9

10

A. Not that I know of.

10

11

Q. You visited with the railroad's doctor,

11

12

problems with your knees?

12

Dr. Hegmann; do you recall that?

down stairs, uneven ground, not enough to say that
they're painful, but they do bother me.
Q. Are you saying today that you don't have
pain in your knees?

13

A. Yes.

13

A. Not standing, no, I don't.

14

Q. Did you tell Dr. Hegmann that you would

14

Q. If you're in a different position do you

15

go back to work as a machinist if you could?

15

have pain in your knees?

16

A. I believe so, yes.

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Have you looked for any other

17

Q. What positions are those?

18

A. Oh, sometimes laying down or if I'm

18

employment?

19

A. Yes, I have.

19

kneeling or if I'm walking up a hill or walking on

20

Q. What have you looked for?

20

uneven ground, sometimes that bothers me. Walking

21

A. I've looked for a lot of part-time work,

21

upstairs, walking downstairs.

22

because I would like to get into finding out how I

22

Q. Did you like your job as a machinist?

23

would be able to work or if I could even work. So

23

A. Yes, I did.

24

I've applied at a lot of auto parts stores,

24

Q. Certainly earning a salary that you

25

Converges, Sears. I can't remember everything,

25

testified to earlier was a good thing, right?
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1

A. Yes.

1

2

Q. Did you receive any benefits while you

2

3

3

were working for Union Pacific Railroad?

4

A. Health benefits.

4

5

Q. Any other benefits?

5

6

A. Not that I know of.

6

Q. Are you asking them to award you your
lost wages?

A. Yes.
Q. Are you asking them to award you pain
and suffering?

A. Yes.

7

Q. Did you receive vacation time?

7

Q. Why?

8

A. Oh, yes, I received vacation time.

8

A. Because I went through pain and

9

Q. Anything else?

9

10

A. No.

10

11

Q. Mr. Mulford, is this case important to

11

12

you?

suffering after each surgery I had and before I went
into surgery I was in a lot of pain. So-Q. Do you think that Union Pacific did

12

something wrong on March 28, 2009, that caused you to
trip and fall?

13

A. Yes, it is.

13

14

Q. Tell the jury why.

14

A. Yes, I do.

15

A. Because I've wanted to retire at 66.

15

Q. What is that?

16

That would give me more stability in my retirement

16

A. They left a bat wing out which would

17

years, and I've already lost three years waiting for

17

cause a tripping hazard in a position that would

18

this to come to trial. So that kind of impacts me.

18

cause a tripping hazard. They had no cones out that

19

I would just like to be able to retire and have a

19

would indicate where it was.

20

halfway decent life for my wife and I.

20

21
22
23

Q. Are you asking this jury to award you
damages in this case?

21

have some responsibility for the trip and fall in

22

March 28, 2009?

A. Yes.

23

24

Q. What are you asking them to award you?

24

25

A. Whatever's fair.

25
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Q. And in fairness, Mr. Mulford, do you

A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you have an explanation as to why you
didn't see the bat wing and tripped and fell?
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1

with my knee. They said it was a possible ligament

2

2

tear.

3
4

your attorneys showed the jury earlier.

5
6

plaintiff Plaintiff's Exhibit 6?

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Do you have that,

A. Yes.

9

5

Q. Sure. It says rule out meniscus injury

6

of both the lateral and medial meniscus and also rule

7

out an anterior cruciate ligament tear or injury.

9

Q. All right. If you'/I look In the middle

10
11

A. Would you reread that for me?

8

Mr. Mulford?

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Did I read that
correctly?

4

MR. DENSLEY: Can you please show the

7
8

3

Q. Okay. Let's look at that exhibit that

impression.

A. Okay.
Q. Okay. NOw, we talked a little bit about

10

jobs that you've applied for; do you recall that

ofthe document under impression. Let me read this

11

testimony?

12

for you and tell me if I'm reading this right. Under

12

A. Yes.

13

number three it says rule out meniscus injury of both

13

Q. And you told the jury that you've been

14

the lateral and medial meniscus and also rule out an

14

applying for part-time jobs?

15

anterior cruciate ligament tear or injury; did I read

15

A. Yes.

16

that correctly?

16

Q. And that the reason that you were

17

applying for part-time jobs is because you wanted to

A. Where is this at?

17

Q. It's right in the middle of the

18
19

document.

20
21

THE COURT: It's on page three of the
document.

18

see If you're able to do the job and maybe work

19

full-time, right?

20

A. Yes.

21

Q. That's not the only reason that you're

22

MR. DENSLEY: Oh, I'm sorry. That's right.

22

23

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, would you

23

24

turn to page three?

25

THE COURT: Page three where it says

applying for part-time jobs is it?
MR. GJ\BIOLA: Your Honor, I'm going to

24

object. This raises an issue that we addressed in

25

our motions in limine.
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MR. DENSLEY: They've opened the door to

1
2
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1

this, Your Honor.

2

3

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.

3

4

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, it's not

4

5

the only reason is it? It's not just because you

5

MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, same objection.
Irrelevant. It's also been asked and answered.
THE COURT: It's been asked and answered.
Sustained.
MR. DENSLEY: If that's been asked and

6

want to see if you're physically able to do the job.

6

answered, I wonder if Mr. Mulford could answer it

7

There's another reason that you're only applying for

7

again. I'm not sure what the answer was.

8

part-time work isn't there?

8

A. Yes.

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure either.

9

THE COURT: Okay. Answer it again then.

10

Q. What is that?

10

The pending question is: So there's a limit of the

11

A. Because I'm limited to only so much

11

amount of money that you can make or what happens?

9

12

amount of money to make.

MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, again I'm going to

13
14

12

That's the question that's pending. You can answer

13

that question.

14

object.

15

THE COURT: Overruled.

15

16

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: What is that amount of

16

17
18
19
20

17

money?
MR. GABIOLA: Same objection, Your Honor.
This, again, addresses our motion in limine.
THE COURT: That question is a different

THE WITNESS: Yes. I can make $780 a month,
and if I make any over that I lose my retirement.

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Okay. And why would
you not apply for -- well, there is an additional

18

reason why you wouldn't apply for full-time work

19

isn't there?

20

A. What would that be?
Q. Well, you recall applying at Ron's Rocky

21

question. That is sustained. I'll sustain the

21

22

objection on that.

22

Mountain Automotive?

23

A. Yes.

23
24

25

MR. DENSLEY: All right.

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: So there's a limit of
the amount of money you can make or what happens?
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24

Q. Okay. And you testified in your

25

deposition that you only applied for part-time work?
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A. Yes.

1

2

Q. And you said it was because they didn't

2

Q. Okay.

3

pay enough money to make it worthwhile. Do you

3

MR. LARSEN: Move to strike l Your Honorl

4

recall that testimony?

4

pursuant to the court's previous rUlings.

1

I'm getting on my retirement.

5

A. To lose my -- no, yes, it's true.

5

THE COURT: Overruled.

6

Q. The full-time job?

6

MR. DENSLEY: That's all the questions that

7

A.

7

S

9

Q. Didn't pay enough money to make it worth
your while?

10
11

The full-time job.

MR. GABIOLA: Objection, Your Honor. Asked

I have l Mr. Mulford. Thank you.

8

THE COURT: Redirect.

9

MR. GABIOLA: Yes l Your Honor. Thank you.

10
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

11

and answered.

12

THE COURT: Overruled.

12

13

MR. GABIOLA: Again it's irrelevant.

13

BY MR. GABIOLA:

Q. Mr. Mulford, you were asked questions

14

THE COURT: Overruled.

14

15

Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Do you recall that?

15

A. About what?

16

A.

16

Q. The FCE, the functional capacity

17

Yes.

Q. Okay. So why is it that a full-time

17

about the FCE; do you recall that?

evaluation--

18

job -- so let's put aside these issues of whether or

18

A.

19

not you could work a full-time job physically and

19

Q. -- that you participated in. Did you do

20

whether or not you would lose any money from your

20

Yes.

that at your request or somebody else?

21

retirement, because, you know, you're making too much

21

A. UP's request.

22

money. Why is it that full-time work at Ron's

22

Q. When did you do that?

23

Automotive otherwise would not be something that you

23

A. I don't recall.

24

would want?

24

A. Because, it makes less money than what

25

25

Q. Were you aware that Union Pacific had
sent the results from that test to their own doctor?
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A. Yes.

1

1

THE COURT: Overruled. This is redirect

2

Q. And--

2

3

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, I need to object

3

THE WITNESS: No.

to that as lacking foundation, assumes facts not in

4

MR. GABIOLA: Thank you. No further

5

evidence, and it calls for speculation on

5

6

Mr. Mulford's part. He doesn't know who it's been

6

7

sent to.

7

4

8
9
10

THE COURT: It was asked if he did know.
The objection is overruled.

8

examination on the cross.

questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Mulford, appreciate it. You may
step down.
Call your next witness.

9

MR. DENSLEY: Well, Your Honorl the

10

MR. GABIOLA: Your Honorl before we

dOl

I'd

11

like to take a matter up outside the presence of the

12

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

12

jury.

13

MR. DENSLEY: All right.

13

Q. MR. GABIOLA: Now, you had the

11

14

foundation--

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen,

14

we're going to excuse you for just a moment.

15

functional capacity evaluation in February of this

15

Hopefully it won't be too long l and then we'll come

16

year; is that correct?

16

back. Don't talk to each other again anymore.

17

A. I believe that's correct.

17

18

Q. Have you received any letter from Union

18

THE COURT: Take up your matter.

19

Pacific Railroad saying you can come back to work?

19

MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, we were objecting

(Outside the presence of the jury.)

20

A. No.

20

so much l and I don't think it should be a surprise to

21

Q. Have you had any contact with anybody

21

the courtl the purpose of our objection related to
the RRB benefits.

22

from the railroad saying that you can come back to

22

23

work as a machinist?

23

THE COURT: I understand that.

24

MR. GABIOLA: And the message that the jury

24
25

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, this has been
asked and answered as well.

25
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got, which we objected to in our motions in limine
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1

and the basis here was that's more prejudicial than

1

2

probative.

2

3

MR. GABIOLA: And preserve my record for
appeal.

3

THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. Gabiola.

THE COURT: Very good. Your motion for a

4

The reason that I sustained -- or overruled your

4

mistrial is denied. That's the basis for my ruling.

5

objections is that your -- if Mr. Mulford had not

5

The point here is that he was asked whether or not on

6

testified on direct examination as to the reason he

6

direct examination the reason that he only asked for

7

was only looking for part-time work, then none of

7

part-time work -- or only looked for part-time work.

8

that would have come in. But once you asked him that

8

Once that door is open, then the defense is entitled

9

question and he said the reason that he only went for

9

to inquire.

10

part-time work is because -- the only reason is

10

11

because he wanted to see if he could do it, that

11

He could testify that he worked part-time and was

MR. GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, I disagree.

12

opened the door. The defendant at that point in the

12

looking for part-time work. I don't think that that

13

time is certainly entitled to identify for the jury

13

necessarily opens the door for them to ask the

14

that he's got other reasons that he does not -- he's

14

question as to why he wasn't because he was receiving

15

only seeking part-time work.

15

RRB benefits. He testified that he was looking for

16

part-time work because he wanted to first see if he

16

That's -- mitigation is an issue here.

17

I wouldn't have allowed it based on my earlier

17

could do it or not physically. I don't think that

18

rulings except for the fact that that's how he

18

opened the door, but just preserving the record.

19

testified on direct. That'sthe problem.

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, I'm going to
make a motion.

20

THE COURT: Do you want to make a record on
this, Mr. Densley?

21

THE COURT: That opened the door.
MR. GABIOLA: I'm going to move the court
for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Okay.

22

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, it most certainly
did open the door because Mr. Mulford said the reason

23

is because I wanted to say see if I could do it.

24

That's not the only reason. So it would be

25

misleading the jury to lead them to that.
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1
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THE COURT: That was my conclusion as well.

same position in response to your original motion.
2

So they've already indicated they're not planning on

3

going beyond. So that's where we are.
MR. DENSLEY: All right.

2 That's why I allowed it. Otherwise I would not have.
3

I'll be perfectly frank, I would not have allowed

4

that had he not offered that as the reason that he

4

5

was only looking for part-time work. So that's the

5

6

basis for my ruling.

6

Anything else that you want to bring up?

7

THE COURT: Is the report in the record as
an exhibit itself?

7

MR. LARSEN: I think we've listed it, Your

8

MR. DENSLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I do.

8

Honor, but it's only for the purpose of illustrative

9

THE COURT: Do you have anything else on

9

purposes.

10

that issue?

10

THE COURT: Right. It's for my purpose to

11

MR. GABIOLA: No, Your Honor.

11

see if it's beyond the scope. What exhibit number is

12

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, we had filed a

12

it?

13

motion previously on Nancy Collins, and Your Honor

13

14

had ruled that Nancy Collins would be allowed to

14

exhibit. Oh, 14, and we have objected to it being a

15

testify on the basis of their April 6, 2010, report.

15

trial exhibit.

16
17

THE COURT: Right.

16

MR. DENSLEY: So I just wanted to bring that

17

MR. DENSLEY: I don't think that it was an

MR. LARSEN: I'm not going offer the report,
Your Honor.

18

to the court's attention that she needs to be limited

18

THE COURT: Right. I understand.

19

to what's in her April 6, 2010, report and that any

19

MR. DENSLEY: Okay.

20

conclusions, any comments, any statements that would

20

21

go beyond any information that she received after

21

expectation that it was going to be offered. So I

THE COURT: I don't think that there was any

22

that time or any conclusion that she drew after that

22

just want to have access to it in case you made an

23

time would be beyond what the court has allowed her

23

objection that it's beyond the scope of that report

24

to testify to.

24

so that I can look at the report and make a ruling.

25

THE COURT: Well, the plaintiff took that
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25

MR. DENSLEY: Right. And I just want to get
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1

as much of this out before the jury comes back in so

1

May 16,2012

2

we didn't have to interrupt the flow of things.

2

9:07 a.m.

3

THE COURT: Anything else?

3

4

MR. GABIOLA: No, Your Honor.

4

(Outside the presence of the jury.)

S

THE COURT: Is that going to be the next

5

THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record in

6

Mulford versus Union Pacific Railroad. It's May 16,

6

witness?

7

MR. LARSEN: Yes. That's the next witness.

7

2012. We're about to bring the jury in. I'm making

8

THE COURT: Very well. Let's bring them

8

a ruling on a request made by the defense at the

9

close of the trial yesterday where they asked me to

10

10

strike the testimony of Dr. Freeman at page 39 lines

11

11

10 through 24 and page 41 lines 10 through 15.

12

12

13

13

14

14

epidemiological -- say that ten times -- and that

15

15

they can be offered in the case. So I'm not striking

16

16

that portion of the testimony. The video has already

9

back in.

I've reviewed that deposition again and
have concluded that the opinions offered are

17

17

been redacted to exclude things that I've already

18

18

excluded in prior rulings. So that will be allowed.

19

19

Any questions?

20

20

MR. LARSEN: No, Your Honor.

21

21

MR. DENSLEY: No.

22

22

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Let's

23

23

24

24

25

25

get the jury and get rolling.
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1
2
3
4
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1

was clearly a credibility part of his testimony in

2

terms of the reasons that he was using for only

3

seeking part-time work in his testimony yesterday.

4

But there should not be substantive testimony as to

(Outside the presence of the jury at

12:02 p.m.)
THE COURT: As Mr. Opp was testifying, some
things occurred to me that kind of vary on the

5

discussion we had earlier concerning the plaintiff's

5

what the actual value of part-time work is, the types

6

testimony about his efforts to seek employment.

6

of jobs that he could do for part-time work, or the

7

reasons that he's only seeking part-time work since

7

Considering the fact that both the

8

testimony of Ms. Collins and Mr. Opp -- we have the

8

the plaintiff is assuming a full-time position for

9

plaintiff claiming that his lost income claims both

9

both his lost income claims past and future.

10

past and future wages three or four years until his

11

retirement date should be reduced by a minimum of the

So my inclination as I sit here today

10
11

after listening to Mr. Opp's deposition or trial

12 .17 thousand some odd dollars -- that is the 9.50 an

12

testimony is to not allow defense testimony about

13

hour that Ms. Collins testified to -- it strikes me

13

part-time work, railroad retirement benefits, any

14

that the defendant is not in a position to argue

14

calculations as it relates to that. I would allow

15

anything other than is it possible that, number one,

15

testimony as to whether or not there were other jobs

16

he wasn't prevented from work at the railroad, and,

16

that he could have earned more than $17,000 at,

17

number two, could he have had some other job after

17

whether he should still -- could still work at the

18

August of 2011 that he could have earned more at or

18

railroad. I think all of that's fair game, but I'm

19

is there another job that he could have earned more

19

not inclined to allow the additional testimony that

20

than 17 thousand some odd dollars?

20

we talked about earlier. We weren't on the record

21

then, so I thought I better make that comment on the
record.

21

And so for that reason -- I'm just

22

speaking in generalities now so that you can have the

22

23

benefit of some thinking that I was doing as I was

23

24

listening to Mr. Opp's testimony. It strikes me that

24

there now. I'll give you a chance to think about it

25

there should be a limitation on any reference to what

25

and allow you be heard on the record before you give

Paqe 263

I will allow -- I'm just laying that out
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THE COURT: Okay. So where would you put

1

reasons that he was not seeking anything more than

2

part-time work goes to his credibility. Because he

3

MR. LARSEN: I think that you just make a

3

offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full

4

separate instruction that says the parties stipulate.

4

explanation.

2

it?

5

THE COURT: Okay. And you're okay with such

5

And because I felt that he'd opened the

6

door on that I allowed the defendant to inquire are

7

MR. LARSEN: And I'm all right with that.

7

there any other reasons and he offered the testimony

8

THE COURT: Because we often do that.

8

that he did? We talked about it as RRB. He never

6

9
10

language?

Parties agree that these facts are not in dispute or
something like that.

11

MR. LARSEN: Right.

12
13

THE COURT: So you'd agree to something like
that?

14

MR. LARSEN: Yes.

15
16

THE COURT: Does that address your concern,
Mr. Densley?

17

MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, for the record, I

9

said Railroad Retirement Benefits. He just said

10

retirement benefits or benefits or something like

11

that. And so they don't know what it is or how much

12

it is, and we have the testimony of Mr. Opp that if

13

he had worked -- continued to work until age 66, he

14

could have put more money into the retirement

15

benefit, and he's lost that. So I think that's kind

16

of offset I think in terms of the testimony.

17

But in terms of substantive testimony, I

18

felt like his answers particularly as it mentioned

19 . against me, I think that's a good way to accommodate,

19

specific amounts were beyond the scope of the

20

20

question, were not responsive. I offered to the
plaintiffs to strike that or give a cautionary

18

stand by my position. If you're gOing to rule
yes.

21

THE COURT: All right. Let me make a record

21

22

just so -- because we always have to make a record.

22

instruction. You declined that for fear that it

23

We don't do this for anybody but the Supreme Court.

23

would further taint the jury to add emphasis to it.

24

This is my view. My view is that the testimony of

24

And I understand that, but at least that offer was

25

the plaintiff as it went to the reasons for -- the

25

made and declined.
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1

And so the question is now is it

1

2

substantive testimony to which an expert can respond?

2

argument either.

If you want to say, for example -- and I

3

And my view from the outset, the RRB was a collateral

3

don't even know if you want to go there, but if you

4

source. Clearly collateral source evidence is almost

4

wanted to say to the jury in your closing argument

5

never admissible and shouldn't have been in this

5

credibility of the witnesses is an issue and I don't

6

case, and I've made that ruling in the motions in

6

think that you should believe the plaintiff because,

7

limine for that specific reason. So my view is that

7

for example, when he was seeking work, he didn't

8

his testimony goes to his credibility, but it

8

offer all of the explanations for the reasons that he

9

doesn't -- it's not substantive in the sense of what

9

10

are his damages, which is really what the mitigation

10

11

question is.

11

wasn't seeking full-time work. In terms of his
credibility, I'll let you go that far and no further.
And I don't even know if you'd want to

12

And so for those reasons I'm ruling that

12

go there. But if you do, that's as far as 1'1/ allow

13

the defendant when they call Mr. Van Iderstine may

13

you to go. You can't make any reference to

14

not have him refer to any of the reasons that he was

14

statements that he made, any retirement benefits,

15

only seeking part-time work, may not refer to any of

15

nothing like that. I'm not going to aI/ow it. So

16

his railroad retirement disability benefits in any

16

I'm going to limit the testimony or the issue to that

17

way, in any dollar amount, can't even make any

17

question so that we're clear on that.

18

mention of it.

19
20

18

I've emphasized, because that's the only

thing that I have to go by, the first full paragraph

19

Now, anything else that we need to take
up before we bring the jury in?

20

MR. HAYDEN: Housekeeping, Your Honor.

21

on page 18 of Mr. Van Iderstine's report where he

21

THE COURT: Yes.

22

makes -- offers some specific opinions as to that.

22

MR. HAYDEN: We had those extra exhibits

23

I'm not just limiting my ruling to that paragraph.

23

24

He can't talk about it. Period. And I'm not going

24

25

to allow the defendant to argue that in closing

25
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that we needed to mark.
THE COURT: So what have we marked? Have we
made them as part of Exhibit 10?
Page 324
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 200 I WL 1607586 (N.D.Ill.)
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1607586 (N.D. Ill.))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
Richard L. FERREN, Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant.
No. 00 C 2262.
Dec. 12, 200 I.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
;i..CHENKIER, Magistrate 1.
*1 Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Employer Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.c. § 51, et seq.,
to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered while on
the job on December 3, 1998. On October 17,2000, by
virtue of the consent of the parties pursuant to
.c. § 636(c), the case was transferred to this Court for
all proceedings, including the entry of final judgment.
The case is set for a jury trial to commence on February 12, 2002. Presently before the Court are various
motions in limine filed by each of the parties. The
Court's rulings on each of these motions in limine are
set forth below.
I.

The plaintiff has filed five motions in limine, two
of which are unopposed: plaintiffs motion in limine to
bar any reference to plaintiffs prior accidents and/or
injuries and unrelated medical conditions, and plaintiffs motion to bar any reference to the character of
plaintiffs work abilities or habits. Those motions are
granted. Plaintiffs other three motions in limine are
opposed by defendant, in whole or in part, and thus
require some discussion.

A.
Plaintiff has moved in limine to bar any reference
to all discipline ever imposed by the defendant railroad against plaintiff. The defendant does not object to
this motion, with one exception. Subsequent to his
injury and his return to work, plaintiff was discharged
in August 2000 after being accused of sexually harassing fellow employees. Defendant argues that to the
extent that plaintiff claims lost wages for the period
subsequent to that discharge, defendant should be
allowed to offer evidence that the lost wages were the
result of disciplinary measures and not the accident.
The Court agrees with the defendant-although
the possibility that defendant's expressed concern will
in fact materialize seems remote based on the itemization of alleged damages set forth in the final pretrial
order, which discloses no claim for lost wages after
February 15, 2000. Thus, the Court will grant this
motion in limine, and bar reference to any discipline
assessed by the defendant railroad against the plaintiff
However, in the unlikely event that plaintiff is allowed
to seek lost wages for a period of time subsequent to
plaintiffs discharge, the Court will pennit defendant
to offer evidence that the lost wages were the result of
the termination and not the accident.
B.

Plaintiff also has moved to bar any reference to
allegations that the plaintiff engaged in sexual harassment; plaintiffs current work status; or the pending
administrative appeal of his discharge. Plaintiff argues
that none of this evidence is relevant, and all of it
could present the risk of unfair prejudice. Defendant
offers no response to the unfair prejudice argument,
and offers as the only theory of relevance that the
evidence would show plaintiffs bias against the defendant.
The Court is not persuaded by the defendant's
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relevance argument. Plainly, the plaintiff is "biased"
in that he has an interest in the outcome of the case: he
is seeking to recover money from the defendant. In the
Court's view, evidence that the plaintiff was terminated (after his return to work and after this lawsuit
was filed) would be cumulative at best on the question
of bias. Moreover, any marginal relevance that could
be extracted from this evidence would be substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and jury
confusion. The unfair prejudice would stem from the
risk that ajury, if convinced that plaintiff was a sexual
harasser, would find him to be an unsavory person and
thus would be less inclined to find in his favor for that
reason, whatever the merits of his claim. The risk of
confusion and waste of time stem from the fact that
allowing evidence of plaintiffs termination for sexual
harassment might lead to a "trial within a trial," with
the plaintiff attempting to show why the sexual harassment accusation was incorrect and the defendant
trying to prove the contrary-none of which would
shed light on the issues presented by plaintiffs FELA
claim.
*2 Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to bar reference to the allegations of sexual harassment or to plaintiffs termination based on the
charges of sexual harassment. However, in line with
the Court's ruling above, the Court will allow defendant to offer evidence that plaintiff was terminated
from defendant's employ as of a certain date as a disciplinary measure, in the event that plaintiff is allowed
to seek lost wages for the period oftime subsequent to
that termination.
C.
Plaintiff has moved in limine to bar evidence of
benefits received by plaintiff from collateral sources.
In particular, plaintiff anticipates that defendant will
seek to offer evidence that plaintiff's medical expenses
have been paid by health insurance, and that he has
received sickness benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board. Defendant does not object to this motion,
except to the extent that plaintiff may open the door by

introducing evidence or argument that the cost of the
medical bills caused plaintiff to suffer economic
hardships.
The Court agrees with this exception posited by
defendant. Plaintiff is correct that, as a general proposition, evidence of collateral source payments is
inadmissible in FELA cases.
Cen/ral. 375 U.S. 253 (1963). In that case, the defendant had offered evidence of Railroad Retirement
Board payments to show a motive for the plaintiff not
to return to work, even if he had fully recovered from
his injuries. The Supreme Court did not find the evidence irrelevant for that purpose, but rather concluded
that the relevance was clearly outweighed by the
likelihood that the jury would misuse the evidence for
an improper purpose: to offset or mitigate damages.
"-'-~~-'-='-='-'--"-=' The Supreme Court reasoned that
there "will generally be other evidence having more
probative value and involving less likelihood of
prejudice" on the question of a plaintiffs alleged
"malingering" than on the receipt of disability payments. fd. at 255.

The Eichel ruling is thus based not on the lack of
relevance of collateral source income, but rather on
the potential for prejudice. As a result, courts generally have considered the exclusion of collateral source
income not to be an absolute rule, but instead a determination that will tum on the pmiicular facts of
each case. See ~~~~~~~~~-""-'-~"'----"~~
136 F.3d 838. 840-41 (lst Cir.19..2Jn. That is in
keeping with the general proposition that where evidence is relevant, the trial court has broad discretion in
detennining whether its probative value outweighs
any possible prejudice. !:!.!...~~~-'-'-~"'-"-"-',~'-="-"-=
752.760 (7th Cir. I 994). In cases outside the specific
FE LA context, courts have struck the balance in favor
of allowing collateral source payment evidence to
impeach a plaintiffs testimony that he retired due to a
disability rather than to receive a pension, !:!.!...~"-"-~
F.3d at 760: to attack the credibility of a plaintiffs
asseliion that he suffered financial stress as a result of
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income loss after an accident,
mens-Elmo AB, 837 F.2d 817.824 (8th Cir.I9..2.[!; and
to cross examine a plaintiff who had testified that he
had not visited a doctor again about an injury because
he had fallen behind in payments of his bills. Gladden

*3 These cases all reflect that the limitation created by the collateral source rule has itself a significant
limitation: "the barriers which have been created
against the admission of otherwise relevant evidence
because of its prejudicial affect do not extend to the
affirmative volunteering by a plaintiff of testimony
which breaks into the restricted area." ~="-=~-"=
F.2d at 485: see also COWI!I1S, 837 F.2d at 824 ("we
have recognized that a plaintiffs testimony on direct
examination may make evidence of payments from a
collateral source relevant and necessary for purposes
of rebuttal") (cited with approval in Brandl, 30 F.3d at
7601 Here, ifplaintiff"opens the door" by suggesting
to the jury that the costs of his medical bills have
caused him to suffer economic hardship, then the
Court will permit defendant to rebut that suggestion by
offering evidence that those bills have been paid
through health insurance and Railroad Retirement
Board payments. Of course, in the event that plaintiff
opens the door to this evidence, the Court will instruct
the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence may be used.
Accordingly, the Court grants this motion in
limine; however, if the plaintiff offers evidence that
the costs of medical bills caused him to suffer economic hardship, defendant will be allowed to rebut
that suggestion by presenting evidence that those
medical bills have been paid through health insurance
and Railroad Retirement Board payments.

II.
We now tum to the defendant's motions in limine.

A.

The defendant has moved in limine to bar three
different opinions that plaintiff seeks to offer through
its expert, Raymond Duffany: (1) that Amtrak failed to
properly inspect and maintain the D2/D3 switch that
plaintiff alleges was involved in the accident in a
manner consistent with "generally accepted industry
standards and practices"; (2) that after the accident,
the investigation performed by the Amtrak Investigation Committee was not properly conducted; and (3)
that plaintiff worked safely for 32 years prior to the
accident in question. We address each of these challenges in tum.
1.
In his report, Mr. Duffany expresses the opinion
that the defendant "failed to inspect and maintain its
switch consistent with generally accepted industry
standards and practices" (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 3 ("Duffany
Rep.") at 9). Defendant argues that this means that Mr.
Duffany will offer the opinion that Amtrak should
have inspected the switches more frequently, an
opinion that defendant argues Mr. Duffany should not
be able to offer. Defendant argues that pursuant to
authority granted under the Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970, ("FRSA"),
et seq., the
Secretary of Transportation has promulgated a regulation specifYing that switches "shall be inspected on
foot at least monthly."
Defendant asserts that this regulation under the FRSA
"preempts" (or, more properly, supercedes) any
claims under FELA that inspections had to be conducted more frequently, and that Mr. Duffany therefore should not be permitted to testifY that in his
opinion "generally accepted industry standards and
practices" required more frequent inspections (Def.'s
Mem. at 1).

*4 At the threshold, we note that in its response,
plaintiff asserts that Mr. Duffany is not going to testifY
about the frequency of inspections, but rather that the
quality of the inspections conducted was subpar (Pl.'s
Resp. at 8). However, the statement of claims set forth
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by each party in the final pretrial order can be read as
raising an issue concerning the frequency of inspections: the plaintiff has asserted that Amtrak was negligent "[i]n failing to inspect said switch when an
inspection would have disclosed the inoperable and
neglected condition of the switch" (Final Pretrial Order, at 2), and the defendant has asserted that plaintiff
was negligent because he "failed to inspect the switch
points as required" (Jd., at 3). Moreover, the general
plu'asing of Mr. Duffany's "failed to inspect" opinion
is sufficiently open-ended that it could embrace a
number of variations: (a) that no inspections took
place at all; (b) that inspections took place, but less
frequently than the monthly inspections required under the FRSA; (c) that inspections took place at least
monthly, but should have been conducted more frequently; or (d) that the problem was not the frequency
of inspections but rather their quality.
Defendant's argument that the FRSA supercedes
the opinion Mr. Duffany intends to express would
apply only to the third variation, and not the others.
Thus, to the extent that Mr. Duffany intends to express
any of those variations of the "failure to inspect"
opinion, the Court denies this motion in limine. F!\I
However, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to use Mr.
Duffany to sponsor an argument that inspections were
inadequate because they did not occur more frequently
than once a month, we agree with defendant that such
a claim would be blocked by the FRSA.
FN 1. Defendant argues that the evidence will
show that the switch in question was inspected at least monthly (Def.'s Mem. at 2). If
true, of course, this would eliminate the factual underpinning for any opinion by Mr.
Duffany that no inspections took place at all,
or that the inspection regimen was insufficient because inspections occurred less frequently than once a month. However, we will
await trial to see if the evidence offered is as
advertised in the motion.

FE LA and the FRS A both share the goal of

Ci1'.2000) (noting that FE LA imposes on railroads "a
general duty to provide a safe workplace," and that the
FRSA requires the Secretary of Transportation, as
needed, to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for
every area of railway safety"). The FRSA, enacted
some 62 years after the passage of FELA, has the
additional goal of promoting uniformity in the laws
and regulations governing railroad safety. c.'-"'.'-'-'-'=-'''.., J 8 F.3d at 776. In Waymire, the Seventh Circuit held
that a plaintiff in a FELA case could not assert claims
of liability based on alleged unsafe speed and inadequate warning devices that were inconsistent with the
FRSA regulations on those subjects.ld. at 775-76. For
purposes of this case, we find pmiicularly instructive
the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the claim based on
unsafe speed. Id.
In Waymire, the relevant FRSA regulation specified that the speed of the train could not exceed sixty
miles per hour. The collision at issue occurred with the
train traveling twenty to twenty-three miles per hour,
which plaintiff argued was an unsafe speed in the
circumstances. The Seventh Circuit drew on the decision in C5'X Ti"ansportatioll. fllc. v. Easterwood. 507
U.S. 658 (1993), in which the Supreme Court held that
a state law negligence claim based on excessive speed
was preempted by the FRS A speed regulations. The
Seventh Circuit also considered the conflicting district
court authority on whether FE LA claims based on
assertions of unsafe speed are superceded by the
FRSA, and concluded that "in light of [the] FRSA's
goal ofunifonnity and the Supreme Court's holding in
Easterwood," a FELA negligence claim based upon
the speed ofthe train is "superceded by FRSA and the
regulations promulgated thereunder." 218 F.3d at 776.
*5 We believe that in light of the FRS A regulation here prescribing that switch inspections must take
place at least monthly, the rationale of Waymire applies to any claim under FELA that it was negligent
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for defendant to fail to inspect more often than once
per month. Certainly, one might argue that even
though the FRS A requires inspections at least once per
month, specific circumstances in a given case might
have required more frequent inspections. However,
the Waymire court noted that this argument was specifically made by the plaintiff in Easterwood, who
asserted that FRSA regulations prescribing maximum
speeds were simply a ceiling and did not preclude an
argument that lower speeds were negligent. The
Waymire court explained that such an argument would
arguably leave "room for railroad liability if the
plaintiff could show the conditions favored lower
speeds," but that this argument had been rejected by
the Easterwood court. Wavmire 218 F.3d <)076. The
Waymire court found that reasoning persuasive when
considering the interplay between the FRSA and
FELA as respects speed limitations. Jd We see no
reason that the same analysis would not apply here to
the FRSA regulations concerning frequency of inspections.
Citing Grimes v. Norfi)/k Southern Rai!waj' Co,
116 F.Sllpp.2d 995 (N.D.lnd.2000) as his lead authority, plaintiff argues that the Waymire decision
should not apply to the FRSA inspection regulation
here, which plaintiff asserts presents "almost the same
issue" as presented in Grimes (Pl.'s Resp. at 9). The
Court disagrees. The specific FRS A regulations at
issue in Grimes did not specifically address the negligence claimed by the plaintiff in that case. While
there was an FRSA regulation specifying the speed to
be used when using a vehicle to inspect when passing
over crossings, the regulation was silent as to the
speed to be used when inspecting areas between
crossings, which was one area of negligence alleged
by the plaintiff. And, the FRSA regulations were silent
on the question of walkways to be used by employees
inspecting rail cars, which was another aspect of the
negligence alleged. Grimes. 116 F.Sllpp.2d at 1002.
On these facts, the Grimes court refused to extend the
Waymire decision "well beyond its holding to preclude an negligence claim under FELA for any con-

duct by the railroad even remotely covered by a regulation enacted under FRSA." Ie/. at ] 003. We do not
quarrel with the proposition that for a FE LA claim to
be superceded, the FRSA must specifically address the
conduct that plaintiff alleges is negligent. But contrary
to plaintiffs suggestion, we believe that the FRSA
regulation concerning frequency of inspections here,
as the FRSA regulations at issue in Waymire and in
contrast to those at issue in Grimes, specifically would
cover a claim that the frequency of inspections was
negligent.
All of this, of course, should not matter in this
case, since plaintiff asserts in his memorandum that
Mr. Duffany has no intention of offering an opinion
that "defendant was negligent based upon the frequency of the switch inspection" (Pl.'s Resp. at 8). In
any event, the Court hereby makes it clear that Mr.
Duffany will not be permitted to offer an opinion that
the failure to inspect more often than one time per
month constitutes conduct that is negligent or outside
"generally accepted industry standards and practices."
To that limited extent, defendant's motion in limine is
granted. But insofar as Mr. Duffany seeks to express
opinions that no inspections or fewer than one inspection per month were conducted, or that the quality
of the inspections were subpar, those opinions would
not be barred by Waymire. Accordingly, to the extent
that the motion in limine seeks to bar those other
opinions based on Waymire, the motion is denied.
2.

*6 Defendant seeks to bar Mr. Duffany from offering the opinion that the Amtrak Investigation
Committee failed to perform a thorough investigation
after the incident. Defendant argues that such an
opinion would be irrelevant, because the issue to be
decided by the jury is not the quality of Amtrak's
post-accident investigation but rather whether
Amtrak's actions or inactions caused the claimed incident and injuries. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Duffany's
opinions concerning the quality of the Amtrak
post-accident investigation is relevant to Amtrak's
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defense, set forth in the Final Pretrial Order (Final
Pretrial Order, at 2-3), that plaintiff caused or contributed to his own injuries by his own negligence
(Pl.'s Resp. at 11). Plaintiff argues that the contributory negligence defense is based largely (if not exclusively) on Amtrak's post-accident investigation, and
that evidence that the investigation was improperly
conducted therefore would be relevant to that defense.
We agree with plaintiff on this point. We also
agree that opinion testimony by Mr. Duffany concerning the quality ofthat investigation, and whether it
was conducted in a way that such inspections normally
are conducted in the industry, would assist the jury in
assessing the credibility of the Amtrak post-accident
investigation. Defendant argues that it is enough for
plaintiff to cross examine the Committee members to
test their conclusions, and that the jury "does not need
an 'expert' to help them decide what weight to give
the committee's conclusion" (Def.'s Mem. at 4. n. 2).
Certainly, cross examination can establish what was
done, or not done, in the investigation. But, Mr.
Duffany's opinion may assist the jury in determining
what a typical investigation in the industry would
include and whether any omissions are significant.
Thus, we believe the proposed testimony of Mr.
Duffany meets the threshold standard of Federal Rule
=-=-'--"='-"-"~~ of being the type ofinfonnation that
would "assist the trier of facts to understand the evidence." Moreover, Amtrak offers no argument that
Mr. Duffany is not an expert within the meaning of
.o...=c.=--,-==-' or that his opinions about the investigation
fail to meet the other requirements of
Accordingly, defendant's motion to bar Mr. Duffany's
opinions concerning the Amtrak post-accident investigation is denied.
3.
Defendant also seeks to bar Mr. Duffany from
testifYing that "Mr. Ferren had apparently operated
switches [of the type in issue] for over thirty-two years
in a safe manner and there is no credible evidence in
the record to indicate he violated any of the safety

rules as outlined by the defendant in its investigation"
(Duffany Report, at 9). Defendant argues that this
opinion would be an improper effort to suggest to the
jury that because plaintiff allegedly had a 32-year
history of working safely, it is more likely than not
that he was working safely at the time of the accident
(Def .'s Mem. at 4). Plaintiff disavows any intent to
offer an opinion that plaintiffs "general care in the
past renders his conduct at the time of the accident
non-negligent" (Pl.'s Resp. at 12). Plaintiff instead
argues that Mr. Duffany's opinion is relevant for other
purposes.
*7 Insofar as Mr. Duffany seeks to offer the
opinion that plaintiff did not violate any safety rules in
connection with the accident, that opinion certainly
would be relevant to address Amtrak's defense that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. So long as Mr.
Duffany has a sufficient basis under Rule 702 to offer
an opinion on that subject (and Amtrak's papers do not
suggest otherwise), he may offer the opinion that
plaintiff was not negligent in the ways that defendant
alleges.
However, plaintiff has offered no explanation of
the relevance of any opinions concerning plaintiffs
alleged faithfulness to safety rules during the prior 32
years of his employment. The only purpose that we
can see for such an opinion is to suggest that plaintiffs
track record of safe conduct suggests that he was also
conducting himself safely at the time that of the accident-which is, of course, the impennissible purpose that plaintiff has renounced. On this point, we
agree with the defendant, and therefore grant defendant's motion to bar Mr. Duffany from offering the
opinion that Mr. Ferren had operated switches of the
type involved in the accident for more than 32 years in
a safe manner.
B.
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff
from offering evidence that there were defects in
switches other than the switch involved in plaintiffs
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alleged injury. Defendant argues that to establish
liability, plaintiff must show that defendant had notice
of a defect in the particular D2/D3 switch at issue, and
that notice of alleged defects in other switches would
be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to defendant.
Plaintiff argues that evidence of other switches would
be highly relevant to show notice, on the theory that
defendant's knowledge of defects in other switches
would have provided defendant with at least con-

met, then the Court will allow evidence of defects in
other switches that meet these two conditions.
C.
*8 Defendant has moved in limine to bar the
plaintiff from offering evidence or arguing that pain
and suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment, loss of a

normal life, and loss of vitality are separate damages
claims. Defendant argues that damages for loss of

structive notice of the dangerous condition in the

enjoyment, a normal life, and vitality are subsumed

switch involved here (PI.'s Resp. at 12-13).

within pain and suffering, and are not separate and
independent elements of damages. Plaintiff does not
quarrel with that proposition, and does argue that he

Plaintiff is correct that "actual or constructive
knowledge of the hazard is an essential element of a
plaintiffs cause of action" under FELA. Williams v.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation. No. 96 C

should be able to assert separate and distinct claims for
each of those species of damages. Rather, plaintiff
argues that he should not be barred from offering

8637. 19 97 WL 754175. '" 3 (N.D.lll. Nov. fO. 1997),

evidence concerning these matters, since these are part

c

affd, 16] F.3d 1059 (7th Cir.199.]2. Evidence of de-

of the damage she alleges he has suffered from the

fects in other switches might be relevant to the question of notice, but only if they pertain to the specific

accident (Pl.'s Resp. 1-2).

type of switch in question (the D2/D3 switch) and if
the defect involved the same problem alleged here

Both sides are correct. Plaintiff will be allowed to
offer evidence concerning the extent and nature of his
pain and suffering, which certainly could include

(that ballast had been deposited in the switch point
area). If these two conditions were met, then the evidence not only would be relevant, but in the Court's
view its probative value on the question of notice
would outweigh any arguable prejudice from the admission of that evidence.

evidence of loss of a normal life. On the other hand,
defendant is correct that loss of a normal life is not a
separate and independent claim for damages. Accordingly, the Court will grant defendant's motion in
limine insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from offering
evidence or argument that the claims for loss of a

However, at this point, plaintiff has not offered
evidence that these conditions are met: plaintiff argues
that evidence of "the condition of other switches in
defendant's yard" should be admitted, without specifYing whether they were the same types of switch in
issue here or whether the condition of those other

normal life (or loss of enjoyment and vitality) are
separate claims. However, the motion is denied insofar as it seeks to bar the plaintiff from offering evidence and argument that his pain and suffering damages include those items. As for defendant's request
concerning the jury instructions on this matter, the

switches was the same condition that is alleged to be
defective here. Accordingly, defendant's motion in
limine to bar evidence of other defective switches is

Court will address that question at the instruction
conference.

granted. However, at trial, the Court will give plaintiff
an opportunity, outside the presence of the jury, to

D.
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff

explain the evidence it would offer to show that these

from offering evidence or making any statement or
argument to the jury that (I) FELA is the plaintiffs

conditions may be met; if the evidence would be sufficient to support a finding where these conditions are

sole remedy; (2) the plaintiff is not eligible for work-
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ers' compensation benefits; and (3) the congressional
intent behind FELA was to allow a plaintiff to recover

adopted to address the concern that "knowledge of the
presence or absence of liability insurance would in-

more easily than in a common law matter. Once again,
there does not seem to be much true disagreement

duce juries to decide cases on improper grounds."
Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evi-

between the parties on this motion. Plaintiff states that
he has no objection to an order barring him from arguing that FELA is plaintiffs sole remedy or that he is
ineligible for workers' compensation benefits, and

dence 41 I; see also BUItron v. S'heehan. 200 I WL
J ] J 028. at *4 (N.DJII. Feb. /, /00 I ); DFC Commul1ications Corp. v. Eames. 929 F.Supp. 239. 242

CE.D.Tex.1996).

from making any reference to the congressional intent
behind FELA (Pl.'s Resp. at 2). Accordingly, this
motion is granted. However, this ruling will not bar

However, Rule 411 provides that evidence of
insurance against liability is not excluded when of-

plaintiff (or, for that matter, defendant) from arguing
to the jury the burden of proof, so long as that argu-

fered for another purpose. See, e.g., PoslTape Assoc.

ment is consistent with the jury instructions that the
Court ultimately decides to give.

Cir. J 97Q}; BraZill v. Lorillard, Inc .. No. 94 C 976.

E.
Defendant has filed an omnibus motion in limine
regarding "general matters." Several of those general
matters--defendant's request to bar testimony or evidence regarding (1) defendant's net worth, corporate
earnings or punitive damages; (2) defendant's size,
corporate status, power or wealth; and (3) settlement
discussions--are

unopposed,

and

therefore

are

granted without further discussion. The remaining
portions of this omnibus motion in limine are contested in whole or part, and are decided below.

1.
*9 Defendant seeks to bar any testimony suggesting that the defendant is insured, or suggesting
that the plaintiff does (or does not) possess medical
insurance. Plaintiff does not object to this motion
insofar as it seeks to bar reference to defendant's insurance status. However, plaintiff asserts that he
should be allowed to offer evidence of loss of insurance coverage to the extent that that is part of the
fringe benefits included in his lost wages claim.

1996 WL 14033. at" I (N.D.lIl.Jan. I L 1996). In this
case, evidence that medical insurance was part of the
fringe benefits that plaintiff claims to have lost is
relevant for just such another purpose: establishing his
alleged damages. Moreover, allowing evidence of
plaintiffs alleged loss of medical insurance would not
implicate the concerns that ==-'-"-'- was adopted to
address, since it would not tempt a jury to decide the
case on the improper ground that defendant is a deep
(insured) pocket. Indeed, a case can be
made-although plaintiff does not attempt to do
so-that ~~'-'-'- does not apply here at alI, since this
portion of the motion is not directed to insurance
against liability but rather medical coverage.
For these reasons, defendant's motion in limine is
granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from arguing
to the jury that defendant was or was not insured
against liability; the motion is denied insofar as it
seeks to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of the
fringe benefits he lost when he was unable to work due
to his injury.

2.
Defendant seeks to bar plaintiff from offering

Under -'--==~'-'-=~'-'-'-''-'-'-'='''-''--'-'--'-, "[e]vidence
that a person was or was not insured against liability is

evidence of his character. Plaintiff does not object to
this motion, but seeks to reserve the ability to offer

not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted

character evidence to "rebut any testimony proffered
by defendant's witnesses" (Pl.'s Resp. at 3).

negligently or otherwise wrongfully." This rule was
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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), evidence
of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity with that
character trait on a particular occasion. Rule 608 provides a limited exception to that Rule: it provides that
evidence of a truthful character is admissible "if the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." However, we note that not just any attack on
the credibility of particular testimony is sufficient by
itself to trigger Rule 608: the "mere fact that a witness
is contradicted by other evidence in the case does not
constitute an attack upon his reputation for truth and
veracity." United Stares v. Jackson. 588 F.2d 1046,
1055 (5th Cir.1979). To bring the exception in Rule
608 into play, the attack must not be merely on the
truthfulness of the particular testimony, but rather on
the character of the witness for truthfulness.
*10 Accordingly, defendant's motion in limine
barring plaintiff from offering testimony regarding
plaintiffs character is granted; however, in the event
that defendant opens the door by attacking plaintiffs
character for truthfulness, plaintiff will be able to offer
in rebuttal evidence of a character for truthfulness.

3.
Defendant seeks to bar statements by plaintiff as
to what he may have been told by various doctors
concerning his medical condition, arguing that such
testimony would be inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff
argues that statements made by the physicians would
be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),
"because these statements go to plaintiffs state of
mind in electing to undergo the medical treatment he
received, such as physical therapy and surgery" (P!.'s
Resp. at 4).
We do not find persuasive plaintiffs citation to
Rule 803(3). That Rule creates an exception to the
hearsay rule for a "statement of the declarant's then

existing state of mind" Rule 803(3) (emphasis added).
As for the testimony that plaintiff may wish to offer
concerning statements made by plaintiffs doctors, the
doctors (not plaintiff) would be the declarant, and their
individual states of mind would be irrelevant.
Plaintiff also cites to f'vfoss v. Feldmever. 979 F .2d
]454 (10th Cir.1992), to support his assertion that
statements by plaintiffs physicians should be admissible. Feldmeyer involved a suit between the plaintiff/patient and the defendant/doctor, alleging that the
death of plaintiffs decedent was caused by the defendant's negligence and misdiagnosis. In that case,
the testimony at issue was directly relevant to resolve
the dispute concerning the relationship between the
physician and the patient, and the testimony concerning what the decedent allegedly said was plainly
relevant to establishing her state of mind and what she
did in response to the advice of the physician. In those
circumstances, the court found that "the challenged
testimony was a continuum of the physician/patient
relationship and admissible under both -'-=~=-:-'=,
803(3) and (4)." ~~-'-".L~~~-=-,,~~~.
In this case, by contrast, there is no dispute presented here between plaintiff and his treating physicians. Unlike the case in Feldmeyer, Rule 803(4) does
not apply here. In that case, the doctor was allowed to
testify concerning statements made by the patient for
the purposes of medical treatment; in this case, by
contrast, plaintiff seeks to offer not his statement to
the doctors but rather what the doctors said to him.
Accordingly, we find that Fetdmeyer does not support
the plaintiffs effort to admit through plaintiff (or other
witnesses) what he was told by his doctors.
For these reasons, the Court grants this motion in
limine. We note that this ruling should not limit
plaintiff in his ability to establish the nature of his
injuries, as he has identified in the pretrial order two
doctors who will testify at trial on his behalf, and six
other doctors and three physical therapists who also
may testify on his behalf.
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F.
*11 Defendant has moved in limine to bar evidence of plaintiffs medical bills. Defendant argues
that the bills were paid by a group insurance policy as
required under collective bargaining agreement, and
thus are not properly included in damages. Varl!o! v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. d/b/a Amtrak, 909
F.2d 1557. 1565 (7th Cir.1990). In addition, defendant
argues that the medical bills are inadmissible to show
the extent of plaintiffs injuries. Vurhol. 909 F.2d at

We agree with defendant's argument, and so does
plaintiff-with one exception. Plaintiff argues that he
should be allowed to offer evidence of any medical
bills either that he has paid personally (and presumably for which he has not been reimbursed), and which
remain outstanding. We agree with that exception.
Accordingly, we grant defendant's motion in limine to
bar evidence of medical bills that have been paid
through insurance policies. This order does not bar
plaintiff from offering evidence of medical bills that
he has paid personally (and for which he has not received or claimed reimbursement through insurance),
or which remain outstanding and unpaid (and for
which no insurance coverage exists) ..
G.
Defendant has moved to preclude plaintiff from
seeking to recover gross lost wages. Plaintiff agrees
that federal and state taxes (which the Court considers
would include social security tax) should be excluded,
but objects to the other reductions which defendant
argues must be made.
Defendant argues that plaintiff should be required
to reduce from his calculation of lost wages railroad
retirement tax payments that the defendant says
plaintiff did not have to make during the period he did
not work due to his injury. However, plaintiff has cited
a provision of the tax code that indicates that payments

made to an employee in a personal injury action are
subject to railroad retirement taxes, to the extent that
the payments are for time lost (as opposed to other
factors, such as pain and suffering). Plaintiff
acknowledges that if he receives an award of lost
wages for his injuries, he will be responsible for paying railroad retirement taxes on that amount. Given
this concession, we see no reason to require plaintiff to
exclude railroad retirement taxes from the lost wages
contribution.
Defendant further argues that plaintiff should be
required to reduce from lost wages payments for union
dues, transportation expenses and special clothing or
safety equipment which he did not have to expend due
to his absence from work during the period of his
injury. Plaintiff did not respond to this aspect of the
motion, but none of the cases that defendant cites
speak to the issue of deducting these kinds of items
from gross income. Accordingly, the Court will not
require plaintiff to deduct these items from his lost
wages calculation; however, defendant will be free to
cross examine plaintiff on these matters to establish
that the lost wage calculation is inflated.
*12 Finally, defendant argues that the lost wage
calculation must be reduced to present cash value.
Again, plaintiff does not respond to this argument, but
in the Court's judgment, plaintiff does not need to do
so. All of the lost wages that plaintiff claims accrued
between December 3, 1998 and February 15, 2000.
Thus, all the lost wages at issue in this case are past
lost wages. Reduction to present value is relevant only
when the issue is future lost wages. Accordingly, this
portion of defendant's motion is denied.

H.
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff
from claiming that he lost contributions to his 401 (k)
account. Defendant's theory is that 401 (k) contributions are made by deducting a certain amount from a
plaintiffs gross wages, and are not paid by Amtrak on
top of gross wages. According to the defendant,
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p lainti ff already is seeking to recover any amounts that
would have been contributed to a 40 I (k) fund by
seeking lost wages, which would include his 40 I (k)
contributions. Defendant thus argues that any separate
request for recovery of 401(k) contributions would be
a double recovery.
Plaintiff argues that this is not the case, and a
copy of a W2 statement for 1997 that he submitted
with his memorandum in opposition to this motion
appears to support his position. The W2 statement
contains a separate box listing wages, tips and other
compensation, and contributions to the 40 I (k), and
then totals those together in another box to come to a
total "tier I wage." Accordingly, based on the information submitted by the parties, the Court denies
defendant's motion in limine.
1.
Defendant has moved in limine to bar claims for
lost vacation pay and lost productivity pay. The Court
has considered the parties' arguments on this point,
and believes that plaintiff has the better of the issue.
Accordingly, defendant's motions to bar plaintiff from
offering evidence of lost wages and lost productivity
pay are denied. However, that ruling is without prejudice to defendant offering evidence, should it so
choose, to support its interpretation of the lost wage
and lost productivity rules.

K.
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff
from offering evidence concerning lost wages for the
time period that he did not work due to a surgery that
plaintiff claims is unrelated to the accident at issue.
Defendant asserts that in November 1999, plaintiff
was put on a work hardening program to prepare him
to return to work. Defendant argues that this program
was interrupted in December 1999, when plaintiff
missed his work hardening sessions for that month
because he underwent surgery to correct a sleep apnea
problem that was unrelated to the accident. Defendant
argues that had he not missed this month of ~ork

hardening, plaintiff would have been able to return to
work as of January I, 2000 rather than February I,
2000, and that as a result, plaintiffs lost wages claim
should be reduced by that four week period.
*13 Plaintiff argues that defendant's position is
based on speculation, and that no competent proof has
been elicited during discovery to establish that plaintiff was delayed in his ability to return to work because
of the ~GfILapnea surgery. Each side has argued what
the evidence will show on this point, without offering
materials from the discovery record to support their
contentions. Based on the state of the current record,
the Court will deny defendant's motion to bar evidence
of lost wages for the period of his surgery and convalescence for the sleep apnea; however, this ruling is
without prejudice to defendant's right to offer evidence to attempt to establish that, but for the sleep'
apnea, plaintiff could have returned to work earlier
than February 1,2000.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows on the motions in limine:
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE.
I. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference
to plaintiffs prior acts and/or injuries in unrelated
medical conditions is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference
to the character of plaintiffs work abilities or habits is
GRANTED.
3. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference
to all discipline ever imposed by the defendant railroad is GRANTED; however, in the unlikely event
that plaintiff is allowed to seek lost wages for a period
of time subsequent to plaintiffs discharge, the Court
will permit defendant to offer evidence that lost wages
were the result of the termination and the accident.
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4. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference
to allegations that the plaintiff engaged in sexual
harassment, plaintiffs current work status, or the
pending administrative appeal of plaintiffs discharge
is GRANTED; however, the Court will allow defendant to offer evidence that plaintiff was terminated
from defendant's employ as of a certain date as a disciplinary measure in the event that plaintiffs allowed
to seek lost wages for the period of time subsequent to
that termination.
5. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar evidence of
benefits received by plaintifffrom collateral sources is
GRANTED; however, if plaintiff opens the door by
offering evidence that the costs of medical bills caused
plaintiff to suffer economic hardship, defendant will
be allowed to offer evidence that the medical bills
have been paid through health insurance and railroad
retirement board payments.
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE.
I. Defendant's motion in limine regarding opinions by Raymond Duffany is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in pmi, as follows: (a) as to Mr. Duffany's
opinion that Amtrak failed to properly inspect and
maintain the D2/D3 switch that plaintiff alleges was
involved in the accident in a manner consistent with
"generally accepted industry standards and practices,"
the motion is GRANTED only insofar as Mr. Duffany
seeks to express the opinion that any failure to inspect
more than once per month constitutes negligent conduct; (b) the request to bar Mr. Duffany from offering
the opinion that the Amtrak Investigation Committee
did not properly conduct the post-accident investigation is DENIED; and (c) defendant's request to bar the
opinion that plaintiff worked safely for thirty-two
years prior to the accident is GRANTED.

*142. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of defects and switches
other than the switch involved in plaintiffs injury is
GRANTED, without prejudice to plaintiff attempting
to make a showing-outside the presence of the ju-

ry-of the conditions that would make such evidence
relevant.
3. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff
from offering evidence or argument that loss of normal life, enjoyment of life, and vitality are separate
and independent claims is GRANTED; however, this
ruling will not bar plaintiff from offering evidence and
argument that his damages or pain and suffering include those items.
4. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff
from offering evidence or arguing that FELA is
plaintiffs sole remedy, that plaintiff is not eligible for
worker's compensation benefits, and that the congressional intent behind FE LA was to allow a plaintiff
to recover more easily than in a common law matter is
GRANTED; however, this ruling will not bar the
parties from arguing the burden of proof to the jury, so
long as the argument is consistent with the Court's
instructions.
5. Defendant's motion in limine regarding "general matters" is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, as follows: (a) defendant's request to bar testimony regarding defendant's net worth, corporate
earnings or punitive damages is GRANTED; (b) defendant's request to bar evidence regarding defendant's size, corporate status, power or wealth is
GRANTED; (c) defendant's motion in limine to bar
evidence of settlement discussions is GRANTED; (d)
defendant's motion to bar evidence regarding insurance is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to bar evidence
of defendant's insurance status, and is DENIED insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of
the fringe benefits he allegedly lost when he was unable to work due to his injury; (e) defendant's request
to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of plaintiffs
character is GRANTED; however, in the event that
defendant opens the door by attacking plaintiffs
character for truthfulness, plaintiff will be able to offer
in rebuttal evidence of a character for truthfulness; and
(t) defendant's request to bar statements by plaintiff as
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to what he may have been told by various doctors
concerning his medical condition is GRANTED.
6. Defendant's motion in limine to bar evidence of
plaintiffs medical bills is GRANTED with respect to
medical bills that have been paid through insurance
policies; this order does not bar plaintiff from offering
evidence of medical bills that he has paid personally
(and for which he has not received or claimed reimbursement through insurance), or which remain outstanding and unpaid (and for which no insurance
coverage exists).
7. Defendant's motion in limine to preclude
plaintiff from seeking to recover gross lost wages is
GRANTED insofar as it requires a redact in lost wages
to account for federal and state taxes; in all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
*15 8. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff from claiming that he lost contributions to his
40 I (k) account is DENIED.
9. Defendant's motion in limine to bar claims for
lost vacation pay and lost productivity pay is DENIED.
10. Defendant's motion in limine to require
plaintiff to reduce his lost wage claim to account for
the period that he underwent surgery and convalescence for a sleep apnea condition is DENIED.
N.D.Ill.,200 I.
Ferren v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2001 WL 1607586
(N.D.IlI.)
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